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GRIEF, PROCEDURE, AND JUSTICE: THE
SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND
Elizabeth M. Schneider*
INTRODUCTION
The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 is unprece-
dented in the American legal system. The Victim Compensation Fund
emerged from congressional efforts to bail out the airlines from law-
suits arising from the September 11th tragedy. The compromise was
to give those who lost family members, or were injured, something in
return for waiving the right to sue the airlines-to give them compen-
sation for their loss.
In this Article, I examine the Fund through the lens of the ex-
traordinary grief and trauma-both collective and individual-that
has shaped our post-September 11th psychic, social, and political land-
scape. The grief and trauma that we have experienced as individuals
and as a nation is unprecedented-a level of fear, anxiety, sadness,
and a sense of horror as what was previously unimaginable has now
become imaginable. Because the grief and trauma experienced as a
result of September 11th has been so profound, so widely shared, and
so public, it is especially important to consider these issues in assessing
the Fund.
Grief and trauma are the critical human dimension, the backdrop,
the shaping experience that leads to tort litigation and claims resolu-
tion in situations of disaster, as well as in accidents, medical malprac-
tice, and many other cases. But precisely because grief and trauma
are always present in these situations, and it is difficult to distinguish
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DePaul University College of Law. Thanks to Steve Landsman for inviting me to participate
and to all the participants for stimulating and generative discussion. I am grateful to Susan
Herman and the other participants at the National Roundtable on Victim Compensation, con-
vened by the National Center for Victims of Crime in Washington, D.C. on June 9-10, 2003, who
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between degrees of horrible, tort litigation and claims processing sys-
tems often take grief and trauma for granted and render them invisi-
ble or irrelevant. In this Article, I bring grief and trauma to the fore.
I argue that experiences of grief and trauma are relevant to assess-
ment of claims resolution processes and civil litigation, and provide
important perspectives on the efficacy and meaning of these
processes. While I was beginning my research, hearing Kenneth Fein-
berg, Special Master of the Fund, describe that what kept him up at
night was the fear that numbers of potential claimants would neither
apply to the Fund by the deadline of December 22, 2003, nor sue be-
cause of their experiences of grief and trauma,' underscored the im-
portance of these issues and fueled my work.
As the December deadline approached, the impact of grief on the
effectiveness of the Fund was widely recognized. Although ninety-
seven percent of all eligible families ultimately filed death claims with
the Fund, one-third of the 2,884 death claims, and more than half of
the 4,185 injury claims filed, were filed in December 2003.2 A front-
page article in the Sunday edition of the New York Times on August
31, 2003 reported that "[f]ederal and local officials are growing in-
creasingly concerned that nearly [sixty] percent of families who lost
relatives in the September 2001 terror attacks have not filed claims
with the victim compensation fund established by Congress."' 3 By the
end of November, about 1,800 families, or only about sixty percent of
those eligible, had filed claims.4 The number was even lower among
the families of police officers, firefighters, and other uniformed of-
ficers who were killed or injured on September 11th.5 The Special
Master's answer as to why-"one that was echoed by the leaders of
some family groups that coalesced after the disaster-is that many
people are still too paralyzed by their grief to confront the logistical
burden and emotional pain of filing a death claim."'6 "I have met with
1. Kenneth Feinberg, Presentation at Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Annual
Meeting Section on Torts, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 5, 2003).
2. David W. Chen, Man Behind Sept. II Fund Describes Effort as a Success, with Reservations,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2004, at B1.
3. Diana B. Henriques, Concern Growing as Families Bypass 9/11 Victims' Fund, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 31, 2003, at Al.
4. David W. Chen, As Deadline for 9/11 Aid Nears, Many Relatives Haven't Filed, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 22, 2003, at Al. "Even if the current pace of filing continues, however, the [Flund is likely
to reach its December deadline with hundreds, if not thousands, of eligible families empty-
handed." Id.
5. Winnie Hu, Families of Uniformed Victims Are Urged To File 9/11 Claims, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 3, 2003 (Late Edition), at B2, available at LEXIS News Library, NYT File.
6. Id. In September 2003, Christy Ferer, Mayor Michael Bloomberg's liaison to the families of
September l1th victims, said some families had also delayed applying "because they were still
coming to terms with their grief." Id. Ms. Ferer's husband, Neil D. Levin, the Executive Direc-
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thousands of families," Feinberg said. "And you would be amazed at
the number of people who, when I say the deadline is approaching,
still come up to me in tears and say, 'I'm not ready."' 7 Feinberg now
acknowledges that he "underestimated the extent and the depth of the
families' grief."'8
To this subject of grief and the Fund, I bring perspectives shaped
from different vantage points. I live in downtown Manhattan not far
from the World Trade Center and watched the planes fly into the Twin
Towers on September 11th around the corner from my home. Like so
many others living near the heart of the disaster, the events of Sep-
tember 11th have irrevocably affected my thoughts and daily life. As
a civil procedure teacher, I teach about grief and trauma, process val-
ues, claims resolution, litigation, and settlement through the Buffalo
Creek Disaster case and other mass tort cases.9 As a women's rights
lawyer and scholar, I have advocated for the legal system to recognize
the problems of grief and trauma of a particular category of victims
and survivors-battered women-in cases involving domestic violence
or what Isabel Marcus has called "terrorism in the home. ' a
I begin with a description and brief overview of the mechanisms of
the Fund. I turn to psychological literature on grief and trauma gener-
ally, and research on societal and individual experiences of grief and
trauma after September 11th. I examine the Fund through the lens of
grief and trauma, focusing on the centrality of compensation, the pro-
cedural framework, the statute of limitations, and the need for survi-
vors to have a sense of repair. I consider Fund processes in
tor of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, was killed on September 11th. Id. "I
myself am just going to try to file this month," she said. Id.
7. Henriques, supra note 3.
8. David W. Chen, Applicants Rush to Meet Deadline for Sept. 11 Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23,
2003, at Al.
9. GERALD M. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER" (1976). See also KAI T. ERIKSON,
EVERYTHING IN ITS PATH: DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY IN THE BUFFALO CREEK FLOOD
(1976). In 1972, a coal company dam burst, causing a devastating flood that destroyed an entire
town, killing more than 100 people and leaving everyone homeless. Many law teachers use the
Buffalo Creek Disaster case as an introduction to civil procedure. For discussion of my use of
Buffalo Creek in civil procedure, see Elizabeth N. Schneider, Rethinking the Teaching of Civil
Procedure, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 41 (1987), and Elizabeth M. Schneider, Structuring Complexity,
Disciplining Reality: The Challenge of Teaching Civil Procedure in a Time of Change, 59 BROOK.
L. REV. 1191 (1993).
10. See Isabel Marcus, Refraining "Domestic Violence": Terrorism in the Home, in THE PUBLIC
NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994).
See generally ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING
(2000); CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW
(2001); Brief of Amici Curiae, New York State Coalition Against Domestic Violence et al., Nuss-
baum v. Steinberg, 703 N.Y.S.2d 32 (App. Div. 2000) (on file with author). See infra notes 151-
154 and accompanying text.
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comparison with tort litigation, and conclude with thoughts on the
need for both claims resolution systems and civil litigation to integrate
the realities and experiences of survivors' grief and trauma.
II. THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center,
the Pentagon, and Shanksville, Pennsylvania, Congress passed the Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (the Act).1" The
Act was initiated by lobbyists who sought a bailout for the American
airline industry. By September 20, 2001, the framework of this legisla-
tion had been developed. However, Democratic members of Con-
gress argued that compensation for victims had to be part of the Act.
The details were negotiated over twenty-four hours, ending on Sep-
tember 21, 2001.12 The Act limits the exposure of the airlines (a later
amendment includes additional defendants) in any civil litigation to
their insurance coverage and provides the airline industry with $15
billion in loans and guarantees. Title IV of the Act creates the Sep-
tember 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001.13 The purpose of
the Fund is to provide compensation to eligible individuals who were
physically injured as a result of the attacks or to the personal repre-
sentatives of those killed. 14
The Fund was developed as a no-fault alternative to litigation. It is
sui generis, the first time that the government has ever compensated
victims for loss in this way.' 5 Individuals who choose the Fund are
barred from suing all defendants except the terrorists and their orga-
nizations. The Act authorizes the Attorney General to designate the
Special Master of the Fund and for the Master to promulgate substan-
tive and procedural rules for the administration of the Fund.16 Ken-
neth Feinberg, an experienced mediator and expert on mass tort
11. Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (signed into law by President George W. Bush
September 22, 2001).
12. Diana B. Henriques & David Barstow, Fund for Victims' Families Already Proves Sore
Point, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, at Al. For a history of the congressional process, see Robert S.
Peck, The Victim Compensation Fund: Born from a Unique Confluence of Events not Likely To
Be Duplicated, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 209 (2003).
13. Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 401-409, 115 Stat. 237-41 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.A.
40101 (West Supp. 2001)).
14. Id. § 403. See September llth Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,274
(Dec. 21, 2001) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 104 (2002)).
15. For historical perspectives, see Lawrence M. Friedman & Joseph Thompson, Total Disaster
and Total Justice: Responses to Man-Made Tragedy, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 251 (2003); Michele
Landis Dauber, The War of 1812, September 1 1th, and the Politics of Compensation, 53 DEPAUL
L. REV. 289 (2003).
16. September llth Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,274.
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claims resolution, was appointed Special Master by Attorney General
John Ashcroft on November 27, 2001.17 He was the key player in the
Agent Orange settlement, the Dalkon Shield, breast implant, and as-
bestos cases, among others.18 On December 21, 2001, Special Master
Feinberg released the Interim Final Rule, a set of regulations that
were intended to be the substantive and procedural rules of the Fund,
determining who could make claims and how much they could collect
as well as delineating the ways in which claims would be made and
awards granted. 19 After substantial comment and response, the Final
Rule was promulgated on March 13, 2002.20
The Fund affects two categories of claimants: survivors of individu-
als who were killed and individuals who were injured. The Act and
the regulations define eligibility to include claims brought on behalf of
an individual killed in the attacks and rely on state law or relevant
foreign law to determine who the appropriate claimants are.21 The
rules that relate to victims who were injured in the attacks limit eligi-
bility to those who suffered "physical harm" while "present at" one of
the three locations at the time of the attacks or in the "immediate
aftermath" and sought medical treatment within twenty-four hours of
their injury or rescue, or seventy-two if they were unable to realize the
extent of their injuries at the time, or medical assistance was unavaila-
ble.22 "Physical harm" is limited to those suffering physical injury
17. Diana B. Henriques & David Barstow, Mediator Named To Run Sept. 11 Fund, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 27, 2001, at B1.
18. See description of the work of The Feinberg Group, the firm that Feinberg founded, at
www.feinberggroup.com (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
19. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,274.
20. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233 (Mar. 13, 2002)
(codified at 28 C.F.R. § 104 (2002)).
21. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,242-11,243 (Mar. 13,
2002) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 104.4 (2002)). For discussion of some of the complex family law
issues that are involved in the determination of appropriate claimant and valuation of loss, see
generally Karen Gross, Portraits of Grief A Focus on Survivors, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 261 (2003); Carlin Meyer, Who Cares: Reflections on Law, Loss, and Family Values in the
Wake of 9/11?, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 283 (2003); Martha F. Davis, Valuing Women:
A Case Study, 23 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 219 (2002); Nancy E. Dowd, Law, Culture and Family:
The Transformative Power of Culture and the Limits of Law, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 785 (2003);
Richard P. Campbell, The View from the Chair: Model Compensation, Winter 2002, at 4 (A.B.A.
Tort & Ins. Practice Section), available at WL 31- SPG-BRIEF 4 (2002); Nancy J. Knauer, The
September 11 Attacks and Surviving Same-Sex Partners: Defining Family Through Tragedy, 75
TEMP. L. REV. 31 (2002); and Susan J. Becker, Tumbling Towers as Turning Points: Will 9/11
Usher In a New Civil Rights Era for Gay Men and Lesbians in the United States?, 9 Wm. & MARY
J. WOMEN & L. 207 (2003).
22. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. at 11.242. "Present at"
is defined as physically present in the buildings destroyed in the crashes, or in the contiguous
area such that there was a demonstrable risk of harm from the crash. 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,274.
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who sought medical treatment.23 The regulations allow the Special
Master to consider injuries suffered or discovered after this seventy-
two-hour period for rescue personnel. 24 The Act requires that all
claims with the Fund must be filed by December 22, 2003.25
Two types of losses may be covered: economic and noneconomic.
The Act defines economic loss as pecuniary loss resulting from harm
and lists earnings, employment benefits, replacement services, and
burial costs as examples, as governed by available state law. 26 Eco-
nomic loss to injured victims is described as loss of earnings or other
employment benefits, medical expenses, replacement services, and
lost opportunities.27 The Special Master released presumptive loss
calculation tables, based on age and current income levels, together
with explanations for the calculation of those presumptive awards. 28
These award tables calculate loss for income levels only up to the
ninety-eighth percentile of individual income in the United States.
Claimants can also be awarded noneconomic losses for physical and
emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental
anguish, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of society and
companionship, and loss of consortium. Here, the regulations of the
Fund give a flat-rate award, $250,000 per deceased victim with an ad-
ditional $100,000 for the deceased victim's surviving spouse and each
dependent child, although the Special Master has termed this a "pre-
sumption. ' '29 There is no presumed amount for noneconomic loss for
injured victims because each victim's injury is deemed "unique. ' 30
Collateral sources, such as life insurance, pension funds, social se-
curity, workers' compensation, and death benefit programs, are then
deducted from this total amount of economic and noneconomic dam-
"Immediate aftermath" is defined as a period of twelve hours after the particular crash for civil-
ians and ninety-six hours for rescue workers. Id.
23. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. at 11,234, 11,242. It
was originally twenty-four hours. See September l1th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66
Fed. Reg. at 66,282.
24. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. at 11,242 (codified at 28
C.F.R. § 104.2 (2002)).
25. Id. at 11.235.
26. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 402(5), 115
Stat. 237 (2001) [hereinafter Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act].
27. Id.
28. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXPLANATION OF PROCESS FOR COMPUTING PRESUMED Eco-
NOMIC Loss, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/vc.matrices.pdf (last visited
Oct. 29, 2003).
29. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. at 11,239. The Interim
Final Rule awarded only $50,000 per spouse and child. Id.
30. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND FREQUENTLY ASKED QUES-
TIONS, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/faq6 (last visited-Nov. 7, 2003).
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ages. The Act does not define collateral sources but provides exam-
ples.31 This is the most controversial aspect of the program. In the
Final Rule, the Special Master adjusted the proposed collateral offsets
of the Interim Rule, and the regulations provide that charitable gifts
are not offset.
As to the procedures involved in the claim submission, the Act sets
forth the requirements of a claim form, the contents of that form, the
issues that may be reviewed and determined by the Special Master,
and the time frames for processing and payments. 32 Claimants can be
represented by an attorney and present evidence to the Special
Master,33 but the Act does not provide claimants with a right to a
"hearing on the record."'34 It preserves "any other due process rights
determined appropriate by the Special Master" and mandates that the
findings of the Special Master are not subject to judicial review. 35
The Special Master developed a two-track system for claims
processing. If a claimant chooses Track A, a Claims Evaluator will
determine eligibility and the claimant's presumed award based upon
the documentary evidence supplied, and "within 45 days of the date
the claim was deemed filed" (the date all required documentation is
submitted), the claimant will be informed in writing of the Evaluator's
determinations. 36 At that time, the claimant may accept the award
and request payment or request a review before the Special Master or
his designee. At this review hearing, the claimant may submit addi-
tional evidence of "extraordinary circumstances" indicating that the
presumed award does not adequately address the claimant's losses. 37
This review by the Special Master is the only appeal available, and it
must be completed within 120 days of the claim filing.38 The result of
this hearing is not subject to any further review or appeal. Within
twenty days of the final determination, payment must be authorized. 39
If a claimant chooses Track B, the claimant will proceed directly to
a hearing with the Special Master or his designee.40 At this hearing,
which is deemed "nonadversarial," the claimant can produce evi-
31. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, supra note 26, § 402(4).
32. Id. § 405.
33. Id. § 405(b)(4)(B).
34. Id. § 405.
35. Id. § 405(b)(3), (b)(4)(C).
36. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,274, 66,279 (Dec. 21,
2001) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 104 (2002)).
37. Id. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233, 11,243-
44 (Mar. 13, 2002) (explaining use of the term "extraordinary circumstances" in the Final Rule).
38. See Air Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act, supra note 26, § 405(b)(3).
39. See id. § 406(a).
40. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,279.
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dence, by way of documentary evidence and live witness testimony, of
the "extraordinary circumstances" that demonstrate why the pre-
sumptive award amounts do not provide adequate compensation. 41
The claimant can, but need not, be represented by counsel at this
hearing.42 Although the Interim Final Rule had limited the length of
this hearing to two hours, the Final Rule modified this limit.43 There
is no appeal or review of the findings made in a Track B hearing.44
In light of the crucial decisions that claimants have to make as to
whether to go with the Fund, the Special Master attempted to make
the Fund accessible. 45 He has recognized that it may be unfair to ask
claimants to waive all rights to litigation before they have any idea
what they might recover from the Fund. The Final Rule provides for
claimants to seek and to obtain a preliminary, nonbinding estimate of
recovery within the Fund, in order to help claimants make a more
informed decision as to whether or not to file with the Fund.46 Fein-
berg has urged claimants to use this provision, and many families are
trying to take advantage of it.
The Fund is Feinberg. As one commentator explained: "To the ex-
tent [the Fund] has a logic, Feinberg as Special Master has imposed it.
It is Feinberg who drafted the rules for disbursing the Fund, Feinberg
who is determining how the rules are administered, and Feinberg who
will hear appeals from people unhappy with the way the rules have
been applied. '47 He refers to the Fund as "my Fund."
The claims that were filed came in slowly. Feinberg estimates that
there are approximately 3,000 potential death claimants and, by the
December deadline, 2,884 had been filed, ninety-seven percent of the
estimated total.48 But by the end of November, only sixty percent had
filed with the Fund.49 In the summer of 2003, Feinberg hired addi-
tional staff to help process what he hoped would be many new claims,
and he held highly-publicized town meetings for potential claimants in
the fall. He made an all-out effort to get all claimants to file by the
December 22, 2003 deadline, which was ultimately successful. How-
41. Id. at 66,279-80.
42. Id. at 66,280.
43. See id. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233, 11,244
(Mar. 13, 2002) (codified at 28 C.F.R. §104 (2002)).
44. 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,279.
45. See discussion of the Fund infra notes 121-122 and accompanying text.
46. 67 Fed. Reg. at 11,234.
47. Elizabeth Kolbert, The Calculator, NEW YORKER, Nov. 25, 2002, at 42, 43-44. Feinberg is
not being paid for his work on the Fund. Id. at 44.
48. Chen, supra note 4.
49. Id.
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ever, Feinberg, government officials, and survivors' groups now recog-
nize that the families' continuing grief was an obstacle to their filing.50
III. GRIEF, TRAUMA, AND RECOVERY
Grief and trauma are always in the background of tort litigation or
the claims resolution process-they are the "silent partners" in these
cases. 51 Whether it is Agent Orange, Dalkon Shield-mass tort
cases-or the everyday individual medical malpractice and accident
cases in which there has been serious harm, we take for granted that
there is loss, suffering, grief, and trauma for the individuals and fami-
lies involved. In the legal system, individual or collective grief and
trauma become almost invisible; they are the necessary context that is
never mentioned or emphasized. As medical malpractice and tort liti-
gation has increased, it is arguable that there has been an increased
numbing of the recognition of grief and trauma in the larger society.
People frequently read about terrible situations of death, accident, or
injury in newspapers or hear about them on television when there is a
lawsuit. The issue is narrowed to compensation-what did the indi-
viduals who were suing "get" in monetary terms for the harm that
they claimed to suffer?
Recent terrorism disasters have brought grief and trauma more di-
rectly into our national experience. The Oklahoma City bombing and
the first World Trade Center bombing brought mass disaster directly
into public consciousness. But the September 11th disaster was on an
entirely different level. It involved a combination of horrifying situa-
tions that were previously unthinkable-airplanes flying into the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and multiple coordinated air-
line hijackings and suicide bombings-that placed our government at
risk. A huge number of people were killed and many died in particu-
larly horrible ways. There was enormous damage to New York City
and Washington, D.C. that emphasized the vulnerability of these cen-
ters of government and finance. The events were constantly replayed
on national television, and thus relived by the public in this country
and around the globe. September 11th consumed our national con-
sciousness and became a defining moment. The entire country was in
mourning-experiencing loss, grief, and trauma-not only for the in-
dividuals who died or were injured and for their families and friends,
50. Feinberg, supra note 1; Henriques, supra note 3. In November, Feinberg remained opti-
mistic that most claimants would file by the deadline. Kenneth Feinberg, Presentation at Brook-
lyn/Cardozo Faculty Workshop on Ethical, Economic and Social Issues in Mass Torts (Nov. 4,
2003).
51. 1 am grateful to Aaron Twerski for this phrase.
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but for ourselves as individuals and as a nation, for the horrors that we
had collectively witnessed, and for the loss of our sense of safety and
invulnerability as a country.
Grief and trauma are distinguishable. Grief is a feeling that we or-
dinarily assume is experienced by a living person in response to the
death of another, while trauma can be experienced by persons who
have themselves been injured, a person responding to another's death,
or by others in a community more broadly. However, in the context
of September 11th; this distinction may be less meaningful. Families
and friends certainly experienced profound grief for people close to
them who died. But there was a sense of mass grief; people felt grief
for victims and for the victims' families and friends on a level that they
could not have imagined even if they did not personally know anyone
who died. The New York Times' "Portraits of Grief," commemorating
the victims' lives "interrupted as they were being actively lived, '52
powerfully reflected these feelings and elicited extraordinary reactions
from readers around the country and the world. Pamela A. Mann, a
lawyer in Manhattan, expressed this sense of collective grief when she
wrote to the Times that "[r]eading these portraits is my act of Kad-
dish."'53 Many people in New York, in Washington, D.C., throughout
this country, and around the world, were traumatized by these events,
even if they did not lose friends or family. Many people suffered per-
vasive anxiety and fear that similar events would happen again. Col-
lective and individual experiences of grief and trauma merge and
overlap in this circumstance, and the strands are difficult to separate.
There is, of course, an extensive psychological literature on the ex-
perience of both grief and trauma. Some of the important psychologi-
cal theorists of bereavement, such as Elisabeth Kubler-Ross and John
Bowlby, describe stages of grief and bereavement. 54 Kibler-Ross de-
52. Howell Raines, Foreword to PORTRAITS 9/11/01: THE COLLECTED "PORTRAITS OF
GRIEF" FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES viii (2002). Raines notes, "Nothing published in the New
York Times during my twenty-four years on the newspaper has elicited a reader response like the
one we've gotten on 'Portraits of Grief.' Those who've been here longer say the same thing." Id.
For discussion of Portraits of Grief and its implications for law, see generally Gross, supra note
21, and Meyer, supra note 21.
53. Janny Scott, Introduction to PORTRAITS 9/11/01: THE COLLECTED "PORTRAITS OF GRIEF"
FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES, supra note 52, at ix. Kaddish is the Jewish prayer for the dead.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, UNA-
BRIDGED 1230 (1993).
54. ELISABETH KOBLER-Ross, ON DEATH AND DYING (1969); JOHN BOWLBY, LOSS: SADNESS
AND DEPRESSION 85-96 (1980). Although Ktibler-Ross' framework was first developed with pa-
tients who had terminal illnesses and was based on their experiences in coming to terms with
their illnesses, it has now developed as a framework for bereavement in general. Betty J.
Kramer, Analysis of End-of-Life Content in Social Work Textbooks, 39 J. Soc. WORK EDUc. 299,
311 (2003).
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scribes these stages as denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and ac-
ceptance; 55 Bowlby describes a period of numbing (with occasional
outbursts of anger), yearning and searching for the lost figure, disor-
ganization and despair, and then a lesser or greater degree of organi-
zation.5 6 But both emphasize that these stages are not tidy or
necessarily linear. The critical point is that one does not simply "get
over" grief and "move on," putting the loss behind.
Indeed, psychological literature on grief challenges a central as-
sumption that lawyers make about the legal system--the notion that
litigation or claims resolution always provides "closure. ' 57 We assume
that to recover from the loss of a loved one, it is necessary for a survi-
vor to confront the loss, reflect on the events that caused the death
and the memories of the person who died, and work toward detaching
oneself emotionally from the deceased.58 But mental health profes-
sionals tell us that litigation is no easy panacea for "moving on" from
grief. Social worker Paul Rosenblatt argues that "[i]nvolvement in lit-
igation may speed up, slow down or alter an individual litigant's griev-
ing ...[t]he completion of litigation, no matter what the outcome,
may lead to new or renewed grieving and relationship problems. '59
Margaret and Wolfgang Stroebe explain why this might be so. They
55. KOBLER-Ross, supra note 54, at 34-121.
56. BOWLnY, supra note 54, at 85.
57. By assessing the impact of legal process on emotions, this inquiry is consistent with work
on therapeutic jurisprudence. Therapeutic jurisprudence considers the law as a force or agent
that affects social behavior, having an impact on individuals' psychological well-being and emo-
tional life. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An Overview, 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV.
125 (2000). Emerging from mental health law, therapeutic jurisprudence has now been applied
to a number of legal areas, including criminal law, juvenile law, family law, and tort law. Id., at
129. See generally David B. Wexler & Bruce Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a New Ap-
proach to Mental Health Law Policy Analysis and Research, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979 (1991)
(mental health law); David B. Wexler, Robes and Rehabilitation: How Judges Can Help Offend-
ers "Make Good," 38 CT. REV. 18 (2001) (criminal law); Gene Griffin & Michael J. Jenuwine,
Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence To Bridge the Juvenile Justice and Mental Health Systems, 71 U.
CIN. L. REV. 65 (2002) (juvenile law); Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best
Interests of Children and the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79 (1997) (family law);
Daniel W. Shuman, Making the World a Better Place Through Tort Law?: Through the Therapeu-
tic Looking Glass, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 739 (1993) (tort law). See generally ESSAYS IN
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1991). For example, in
the area of personal injury law, compensation is usually thought of as a means to make injured
people whole again, to put them into the position they were prior to the accident. Therapeutic
jurisprudence, however, looks at compensation as part of the process of recovery from personal
injury, and examines the effects of legal procedures on psychological well-being. Wexler &
Winick, supra.
58. Daniel W. Shuman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The Psychology of Compensation in Tort
Law, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 39, 62 (1994) (citing Margaret Stroebe & Wolfgang Stroebe. Does
"Grief Work" Work?. 59 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 479 (1991)).
59. Paul C. Rosenblatt, Grief and Involvement in Wrongful Death Litigation, 7 Law & Hum.
Behav. 351, 351 (1983).
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challenge the "truism" that to recover from bereavement, one needs
to do one's "grief work . . . the cognitive process of confronting the
reality of loss, of going over events that occurred before and at the
time of death, and of focusing on memories and working toward de-
tachment from the deceased. 60 The Stroebes' empirical study of wid-
ows and widowers in Southern Germany explored the dimensions of
conjugal bereavement in order to assess the coping strategies of con-
fronting versus avoiding grief-meaning avoiding reminders of the de-
ceased person. The results of the study suggested a gender difference
for widows and widowers in which, "men [were] more likely to man-
age to block confrontation with their loss more completely than wid-
ows, who, even when they try not to dwell on their grief, are more
frequently confronted with it.'' 61 Because of gender differences in
homemaking roles, they concluded that the opportunities for distrac-
tion from grieving are far greater for men than for women.62 This
literature suggests that the notion of "closure" for grief is overly
simplistic.
Trauma is another matter, and here, the psychological literature is
also nuanced. In her book Trauma and Recovery, psychiatrist Judith
Herman writes about the connections between personal harm, politi-
cal terror, and trauma. Although she focuses primarily on trauma ex-
perienced by people who have suffered violence themselves, 63 her
insights on trauma have more general application. She writes that
"traumatic events overwhelm the ordinary systems of care that give
people a sense of control, connections and meaning. ' 64 They "are ex-
traordinary... because they overwhelm the ordinary human adapta-
tions to life ... and generally involve threats to life or bodily integrity,
or a close personal encounter with violence and death. '65 They con-
front human beings with the extremities of helplessness and terror,
and evoke the responses of catastrophe. According to the Compre-
hensive Textbook of Psychiatry, the common denominator of psycho-
logical trauma is a feeling of "intense fear, helplessness, loss of control
and threat of annihilation. ' 66 Herman describes the psychological re-
sponse to trauma, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), as involving
60. Stroebe & Stroebe, supra note 58 at 479.
61. Id. at 481.
62. Id.
63. JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 2 (1997). Herman's focus is on sexual
and domestic violence, as well as combat veterans and victims of political terror. Id.
64. Id. at 33.
65. Id.
66. Id. (quoting N.C. Andreason, Post-Tramatic Stress Disorder, in COMPREHENSIVE TEXT-
BOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 918-24 (H.I. Kaplan & B.J. Sadock eds., 4th ed. 1985)).
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"hyperarousal ... the persistent expectation of danger ... intrusion
... the indelible imprint of the traumatic moment," and "constriction
... the numbing response of surrender. ' 67 The Diagnostic and Statisti-
cal Manual of Mental Disorders-Fourth Edition defines PTSD as a re-
sponse that involves "intense fear, helplessness or horror (or in
children, the response must involve disorganized or agitated behav-
ior). ' 68 Yet there is no simple agreement among experts about what
trauma is. Experts debate the meaning of trauma, and recognize that
trauma may be shaped by cultural and political forces.69
Disasters carry particular traumatic meaning. Jenny Edkins writes,
"[a]n incident is seen as traumatic if it involves an exposure to an
event so shocking that our everyday expectations of how the world
works are severely disrupted. '70 She describes "[o]ne of the most
striking images of September 11 was that of people on the sidewalks
in New York, their hands clasped over their mouths, transfixed in hor-
ror as they watched the impossible turning into the real in front of
their eyes."'71 The traumatic impact of mass disasters was documented
in the Buffalo Creek disaster case, involving a flood in West Virginia
that killed 125 people and left thousands homeless in 1972. Kai Erik-
son, a sociologist at Yale University, Richard Honig, a psychiatrist at
the University of Cincinnati, and others developed evidence concern-
ing the psychological trauma that individuals suffered, as well as the
traumatic impact of the resultant loss of community and social ties.
Their evidence documented elevated rates of anxiety, alcoholism and
depression, nightmares, flashbacks, a feeling of numbness in which
survivors isolated themselves from friends and family, and "under-
achieving at work, avoiding even the slightest risk."'72 Erikson's book
on the disaster, which emphasized the loss of community ties, has be-
come a classic. 73
There is now extensive psychological literature on the trauma that
resulted from September 11th, both in New York and nationally. One
study that was conducted to determine the prevalence of psychopath-
ological disorders in Manhattan after September 11th found that in
67. Id. at 35 (internal quotation marks omitted).
68. Felicia R. Lee, Is Trauma Being Trivialized? N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2003, at A13 (examining
the debate among psychologists and psychiatrists about trauma and whether it is being diag-
nosed correctly).
69. Id.
70. Jenny Edkins, Forget Trauma? Responses to September 11, 16 Tr'L REL. 243, 245 (2002).
71. Id. at 243.
72. Jonathan Eig, How a Tiny Stream May Help New York Recover from Tragedy, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 16, 2001, at Al.
73. ERIKSON, supra note 9, at 186-245; see also KAI T. ERIKSON, A NEW SPECIES OF TROUBLE:
EXPLORATIONS IN DISASTER, TRAUMA, AND COMMUNITY 236 (1994).
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the area below 110th Street, approximately 67,000 had acute PTSD,
and approximately 87,000 had depression within two months after the
incident. 74 For those who lived south of Canal Street, and closer to
the World Trade Center, the prevalence of PTSD was even higher.75
Not surprisingly, the prevalence of PTSD was higher among persons
who were more directly exposed to the attacks or their consequences
than among persons with less exposure. 76 Factors traditionally associ-
ated with grief, such as loss of a family member, increased the likeli-
hood of depression. 77 Other studies show considerable workplace
stress for employees who have suffered September 11th-related psy-
chological injuries, and most of these claims were likely to be covered
by workers' compensation. 78 Congress held hearings on the mental
health needs of communities affected by September 11th, recognizing
the severity of the mental health problems. 79 Many have documented
the particular impact of September 11th on their daily work life and
institutional communities, 80 as well as psychological functioning in
general.81
One counselor described the range of different reactions and psy-
chological dynamics that occurred nationally in response to Septem-
ber 11th: immersion in the media coverage; avoidance; denial and
detachment; tunnel vision and becoming task-oriented; triggering
memories and pain from previous trauma; inappropriate reactions and
behaviors such as looting and price-gouging; becoming hyperreactive;
74. Sandro Galea et al., Psychological Sequelae of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks in New
York City, 346 NEw ENG. J. MED. 982, 985 (2002).
75. Id. at 985-86.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 986.
78. Frances Codd Slusarz, Workplace Stress Claims Resulting from September 11th. 18 LAB.
LAW. 137, 144-62 (2002). See also Deborah Katz & Avi L. Kumin, Family and Medical Leave Act
Issues Post-9/1l, Including PTSD Requests for Flexible Leave Schedules and Work From Home
(A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study, Apr. 2002), available at WL VPC0411 121.
79. Psychological Trauma and Terrorism: Assuring That Americans Receive the Support They
Need: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong. 1-2
(2001) (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Health, Education,
Labor, and Pensions).
80. Id. See generally Tanina Rostain, When the Towers Collapse Outside Your Window: Teach-
ing Law in the Aftermath of 9-11, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 197 (2002).
81. See generally Mark J. Maggio, September lth and the Crisis Response for the Federal
Courts, 66 FED. PROBATION 11 (2002); Karen Sawislak, September 11 and New York City: Pat-
terns of Urban Disaster in the United States, 34 URB. LAW. 599 (2002); Patrick B. Johnson &
Linda Richter, The Impact of 9/11 and Its Aftermath on Substance Use and Psychological Func-
tioning: An Overview, 30 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 1455 (2003).
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and trying to get back to everyday routines.82 There was a "shattering
of one's assumptions about what to expect in everyday life; preoccu-
pation with environmental dangers and associated anxiety, fear and
isolation and/or loss of both a personal and a national 'sense of
safety." 83 Another common set of reactions was emotional: breaking
down and crying, difficulty going to or staying asleep, irritability, tem-
per outbursts, mood swings and surges of depression, grief or rage,
nausea or body aches, and marked appetite changes. Survivor guilt
has also been a problem for some, although much more so for persons
who were directly connected with the dead and missing; others have
experienced feeling very helpless, pessimistic, or extremely
frustrated. 4
The demographics of the tragedy suggest that the median age of
those who died was thirty-nine, about three quarters were men, and
many had spouses and children.8 5 As a result, many of the survivors
are widows with children. An issue of People magazine highlighted
this with a cover photo of thirty-one widows and their children a few
months after the disaster.8 6 Thus, for many of the survivors who are
confronted daily with human and financial challenges, getting them-
selves and their children up in the morning, and making it through the
day, Stroebe and Stroebe's insights are particularly relevant.8 7 Every
day is a reminder of the loss and its impact on their lives. "Closure" is
next to impossible. Each anniversary, each holiday season, each birth-
day is a reminder of the grief.88
Loss of community for the families of September 11th has been a
serious problem. In an article focusing on the September 11th fami-
82. Raymond Monsour Scurfield, Commentary About the Terrorist Acts of September 11, 2001,
Posttraumatic Reactions and Related Social and Policy Issues, TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE,
Jan. 2002, at 3-14.
83. Id. at 4-8.
84. Id. at 7-8.
85. Gross, supra note 21, at 274.
86. Galina Espinoza et al., Small Blessings, PEOPLE WKLY., Feb. 25, 2002, at 48-74.
87. Stroebe & Stroebe, supra note 58.
88. The first anniversary of the disaster presented tremendous challenges to counselors. One
observed:
This kind of anniversary evokes emotional and physiological responses in the victims
directly affected, regardless of whether they witnessed the suffering, injury, or death of
others, or if they were themselves injured. Additionally it is disturbing to millions eve-
rywhere, producing a variety of emotions and reactions in people across the country.
September 11, 2002, was a time to remember, grieve, and look to the future. It was also
a time of heightened awareness of our vulnerability, fear of additional terrorism, and
concern for losing more lives.
Karin Jordan, What We Learned from the 9/11 First Anniversary, 11 FAM. J.: COUNSELING &
THERAPY FOR COUPLES & FAMILIES, April 2003, at 110.
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lies one year later, Kirk Johnson observed, "a year later, the families
of Sept. 11-a small city's worth of widows, parents and other kin
touched by terror-say that what defines them most is their sense of
separation from other Americans."8 9 Articles have linked the Buffalo
Creek disaster with September 11th, quoting Kai Erikson on the post-
traumatic stress experience of survivors, 90 with an emphasis the com-
mon problems of loss of community. 91
Herman and Erikson's work emphasizes the human and social
dimensions of repair, and focuses on the affirmative need for commu-
nity-the formation of strong social and community ties-as primary
vehicles of repair.92 Herman writes:
Traumatic events destroy the sustaining bonds between individual
and community. Those who have survived learn that their sense of
self, of worth, of humanity, depends upon a feeling of connection to
others. The solidarity of a group provides the strongest protection
against terror and despair, and the strongest antidote to traumatic
experience. Trauma isolates; the group re-creates a sense of
belonging.93
For Herman, the "stages of recovery" are establishing safety, remem-
brance and mourning of the traumatic experience, reconnection to re-
claim the world, and recognition of commonality with others.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND
In this section, I consider aspects of the Fund from the perspective
of the grief and trauma that families and survivors have experienced.
I focus on the centrality of compensation, procedural aspects of the
Fund, the statute of limitations, and the need for repair.
A. Only Money
Compensation is the focus of the Fund. But the distributive princi-
ples of the Fund are unclear.94 Congress did not make them clear or
spell them out. Feinberg has tried to shape these principles in his
Rules and in their application to individual claims. The Fund can be
viewed as a replacement for the tort system or as a social welfare pro-
89. Kirk Johnson, In Bereavement, Pioneers on a Lonely Trail, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2002, at
Al.
90. Id. See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, New Yorkers Lose Their Inner Rand McNally: Sept. 11 Rips Up
Mental Maps That Guide City Dwellers' Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2001, at Al; Erica Goode,
Lessons from Abroad on Dealing with Anxiety, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2001, at B10.
91. Eig, supra note 72.
92. See generally HERMAN, supra note 63 (1997).
93. Id. at 214.
94. Kenneth Feinberg, Presentation at Ninth Annual Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and
Social Policy (Apr. 24, 2003).
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gram, and seems to have elements of both,95 perhaps because Fein-
berg attempted to infuse the tort framework of the Act with a social
welfare perspective in the Final Rule.96 But, whatever it is, it is indis-
putably a compensation fund, an "administrative agency" in which
Feinberg has attempted to provide money for claimants with "rough
justice. ' '97 The default assumption is that all the government can pro-
vide is money-compensation to repay families of those who died or
survivors of the tragedy for the loss of life or the harms that were
suffered. The assumption embedded in our tort system, from which
the Fund and other claims resolution programs flow, is that money for
loss of life or limb is the primary, if not sole, vehicle of repair for loss.
When there is a death, physical injury, or a terrible tragedy, compen-
sation for damages is what we expect.
It is useful to look at the way that concepts of grief and trauma are
reflected in the tort and social welfare systems. Traditionally, grief did
not play a clear role in terms of damages in wrongful death actions-
actions brought by family members for death of a loved one. Wrong-
ful death statutes protected only the pecuniary interests of survivors,
so nothing could be "recovered for the survivor's mental anguish or
the loss of love and affection that resulted from the death." 98 Be-
reavement is assumed to be in the background of all wrongful death
cases, so it is not "an adequate discriminating principle." 99 By the
1990s, recovery for emotional harm or anguish in wrongful death ac-
tions was permitted in many states."'100 Trauma experienced by survi-
vors might be compensable as "pain and suffering." In an ordinary
tort action in which the individual is suing for his or her own harm, it
is likely that the trauma that he or she experiences will be treated as
damages for "pain and suffering." In a social welfare system that pro-
95. See Matthew Diller, Tort and Social Welfare Principles in the Victim Compensation Fund,
53 DEPAUL L.REv. 719 (2003).
96. Id.
97. Jack B. Weinstein, Compensation for Mass Private Delicts: Evolving Roles of Administra-
tive, Criminal, and Tort Law, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 955 (2001) (describing the Fund as an
"administrative agency [overseen by a special master]"); Feinberg, supra note 94 (describing the
Fund as a form of rough justice).
98. DAN DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 297, at 811 (2001).
99. Robert L. Rabin, The September lith Victim Compensation Fund: A Circumscribed Re-
sponse or an Auspicious Model?, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 769, 802 (2003).
100. DOBBS, supra note 98, at 812. This change has been through new state statutes and judi-
cial interpretation. Dobbs explains that "[s]ome of the statutes now provide for it directly, usu-
ally in addition to the claims for lost companionship, society, guidance and the like. Elsewhere,
some courts have expanded liability to include mental anguish recovery under statutes that do
not specifically authorize it." Id.
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vides a capped amount, recognition of grief and trauma could simply
be implicitly reflected in the amount of the government benefit. 10 1
In the Fund, the Special Master made an explicit decision to cap
noneconomic damages-what might otherwise be compensable in the
tort system as "pain and suffering"-and award them as a flat add-on
at $250,000 to the claimant per deceased victim for what the deceased
experienced prior to death. He explained that was so because he did
not think it would be fair to have to assess and compare the different
horrible ways that people died. 10 2 This is a controversial aspect of the
Fund because in the tort system a pain and suffering claim could result
in a huge amount of money depending on the nature of death and the
circumstances. In addition, Feinberg decided to only include the phys-
ical injuries that injured survivors experienced because if he had in-
cluded mental injuries, that would have added four million New
Yorkers, and many others as well. 10 3 In New York, damages for emo-
tional distress are recoverable in negligence only if the plaintiff suf-
fered a physical impact (caused by the defendant) or was in the "zone
of danger. ' ' 10 4 Feinberg's decisions have led to considerable unrest
and confusion among claimants. Some of the opposition has been
highly organized, like that from the high-earning Cantor Fitzgerald
families. 105
The compensation offered by the Fund is problematic because it is
only money. For many potential claimants, getting the money is not
enough. The claim "award" does not provide the more affirmative
possibilities that litigation might appear to offer-investigation, find-
ing out what happened, attempting to make change so the next time it
will not happen again. One commentator observed,
[t]he U.S. government made two promises to the families of those
who died in the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks: A special Justice De-
partment Fund would compensate their financial losses and official
investigations would uncover the security failures that enabled al-
Qaeda to kill 3,027 people. Uncle Sam asked one thing of the fami-
lies in return: Don't drag the battered airlines and their affiliates
into court. 106
Because the "second promise" of "official investigations" has not
been met, the flat sum that the Fund offers makes brutally clear what
101. Diller, supra note 95.
102. Feinberg, supra note 94.
103. Id.
104. Anthony Sebok, Comment on Draft (Nov. 2, 2003). See generally DOBBS, supra note 98,
§ 309, at 839-40.
105. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
106. Martin Kasindorf, Some 9/11 Families Choose Lawsuits Over Federal Fund, USA TODAY,
July 14, 2003, at Al.
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litigation frequently obscures until the end, that compensation is all
that the government can provide.
In contrast, litigation offers hope that discovery and investigation
will be a source of information that will assist in further prevention of
harm. The Fund is static-it gives money, it ends. It is not transform-
ative-it does not investigate the problem, help others, make change
for the future, or prevent another attack. Feinberg argues that litiga-
tion in this context will not accomplish this more investigative and
transformative purpose, and that may be realistic, but families are
likely to still hold out hope. 10 7
Some families are suing. Although, on August 26, 2003, relatives of
1,995 deceased victims had submitted claims, received settlement
checks that averaged nearly $1.5 million, and agreed not to sue air-
lines, security companies or other U.S. entities,
with official findings of blame for the attacks slow in coming, hun-
dreds of victims' survivors are spurning the government cash and
flocking to federal courts. Undeterred by the difficulty in proving
that anyone was culpably negligent-or by roadblocks set up by
Congress and the Bush administration-the determined survivors
are seeking money and facts on their own.t08
Kathleen Ashton of Woodside, New York, whose son Thomas Ashton,
died at the World Trade Center, put it in the following way:
Someday, please God, I will see my son again ... I need to be able
to look at him and say, "Tommy, I did the right thing." The right
thing is not to take the government money. The right thing is to try
to get answers, to see what sort of lapses allowed the murderers to
do what they were able to do.. 09
Nearly 100 individual and class-action lawsuits have been filed. In
July 2003, New York State extended the statute of limitations for
wrongful death claims, which would have expired on September 11,
2003, by six months to March 2004, so more lawsuits are likely to be
filed.110 The September 11th families are suing not only United and
American Airlines and others in the aviation industry, but they are
107. See discussion of the government withholding of documents to the September 11th Com-
mission infra notes 158-184 and accompanying text.
108. Kasindorf, supra note 106.
109. Id.
110. On July 8, 2003, Governor George Pataki signed a bill extending the usual two-year
statute of limitations for wrongful death suits by six months, making the deadline for filing
March 11, 2004. Anthony Ramirez, Sept. 11 Legal Deadline Extended, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2003,
at B6. Governor Pataki says the extension is meant to reflect "New York's ongoing commitment
to providing support, compassion and assistance to those who lost loved ones in this great trag-
edy." Joe Mahoney et al., Metropolitan Report Six More Months To File WTC Lawsuit, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, July 9, 2003, at 16, available at LEXIS News Library, DLY NWS File.
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also suing Osama bin Laden, Saudi royal princes, Arab banks, Muslim
charities, and the governments of Iraq, Iran, Sudan, and Afghanistan.
Commentators have suggested that it is unlikely that plaintiffs will be
able to recover money from Al Qaeda, so some of the lawsuits seek to
go after the alleged "financiers" of terrorism because they have
deeper pockets.'11 And the litigation process has unearthed some evi-
dence. For example, in one of the lawsuits, evidence has been prof-
fered in discovery that boxcutters were among the potential weapons
that screeners were supposed to confiscate.112 In another case, a de-
fault judgment has been entered against Iraq to pay $64 million to the
families of two businessmen who were killed at the World Trade
Center.1 13 Judge Alvin Hellerstein, the federal judge in the Southern
District of New York who is overseeing all the September 11th cases,
refused to dismiss lawsuits brought by individuals against the airlines,
World Trade Center defendants, and others, so these cases will now
proceed to discovery. 1 4 Some commentators, surprised by this deci-
sion, have argued that it could give September 11th claimants undue
optimism about the ultimate success of the lawsuits.11 5
The implicit premise of the Fund is that the claimants can rationally
decide about whether to sue or file with the Fund. But it assumes that
it is simply the outcome, the money, that will affect the decision-mak-
ing process and that will ultimately determine the claimant's decision.
B. Procedures of the Fund
The focus on compensation alone flies in the face of the work of
procedural justice theorists-RAND studies, Deborah Hensler, and
Tom Tyler-that process matters to people in their claiming decisions
more than outcome. In evaluating a process, individuals will value
how fair the process appears and what the process feels like. Tyler
observes that "[f]airness of a decision-making procedure is especially
111. See Kasindorf, supra note 106.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. In re September 11 Litig., No. 21-MC-97, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15522 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
9, 2003) (order denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss) .
115. Anthony J. Sebok, The Hardest Job in the Law: Judge Who Hears 9/11 Suits (Sept. 25,
2003), at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/09/25/findlaw.analysis.sebok.911.compensation (last vis-
ited Nov. 12, 2003). Feinberg has also expressed concern with the decision. Kenneth Feinberg,
Presentation at Cardozo Faculty Workshop on Ethical, Economic, and Social Issues in Mass
Torts (Nov. 4, 2003).
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relevant when it is difficult to determine what is an appropriate com-
pensation for a loss."" 16
Tyler's work has emphasized that "disputants prefer procedures
that offer them an opportunity to voice their needs and opinions, and
perceive such procedures as fairer than others because they believe
that having a greater opportunity for voice enhances the likelihood of
obtaining a satisfactory dispute outcome." 11 7 Tyler emphasizes four
aspects of procedures that influence judgments about fairness: first,
whether authorities are trustworthy; second, whether authorities are
viewed as neutral, unbiased, honest, and principled in their decision
making; third, whether the processes that are established allow people
an opportunity to state their case; and fourth, whether people are
treated with dignity and respect.11 8
With respect to the Fund, Tyler has some important observations.
The failure to clearly elucidate the distributive principles means that
the procedural aspects of the Fund are likely to be more important.
People want to have a voice in the proceedings and to structure their
own arguments, which suggests a negative reaction to the standard-
ized forms and applications. They want to know how their arguments
have been considered, whether they were accepted or rejected, and
why.119
In the Fund process, there are also many discretionary factors that
enter in and could seem unfair. The Cantor Fitzgerald families have
argued this in their report and in their lawsuit challenging the Final
Rule.' 20 Feinberg has made the program "his," and the fact that there
is one decision maker with so much discretion increases perceptions of
unfairness. Making the program "his" has all sorts of problematic
dimensions. It leads to a sense that he will make individualized
"deals," and indeed, he does. Lawyers can claim to trade on "insider"
access to, or contact with, him. Most important, there is no written
116. Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A Psychological Perspective on Compensation for
Harm: Examining the September l1th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 355, 379
(2003).
117. Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It's Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology, 2002 J.
DIsp. RESOL. 92-93 (2002) (citing E. Allen Lind et al., Individual & Corporate Dispute Resolu-
tion Using Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. Sc. Q. 224, 225 (1993)).
118. Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 116.
119. Id.
120. See Cantor L.P. et al., Submission of Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P., Espeed, Inc. and
TradeSpark L.P. to the Special Master of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of
2001 and to the United States Department of Justice, available at http://www.cantorusa.com/vcf/
DOJsubmission.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2003). See generally Jonathan D. Melber, An Act of
Discretion: Rebutting Cantor Fitzgerald's Critique of the Victim Compensation Fund, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 749 (2003).
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record of hearings or discussions, no written basis for his decision, and
his decision is unreviewable.
There are deep contradictions in the Fund. It has a bureaucratic
dimension in terms of grids, baselines, and presumptions; but Feinberg
has attempted to humanize and individualize the program. This is, in
a sense, Feinberg's personal effort to recognize the grief and trauma
that people have suffered. It provides victims and their families with
an opportunity to have contact with the person who will be making a
huge decision that will impact their lives. Feinberg describes letting
people come to meetings to talk about their loved ones and share me-
mentos, pictures, and videos. He has attempted to infuse the Fund
process with an empathetic and human recognition of the claimants'
need to talk and an acknowledgment of the grief that people have
suffered.
There has been a serious effort to make the procedures of the Fund
accessible and user-friendly. The Fund's administrators have used
technology to communicate through an extensive website that details
the regulations and provides forms, statistics, frequently asked ques-
tions, reminders about deadlines, and information about drop-in cen-
ters. 1 21 But, of course, that assumes that family members have access
to technology. 122 Feinberg and his staff have traveled around the
country to reach claimants and have contacted claimants individually.
There has been a concerted effort to make the process of filing a claim
simple. But, even with these best efforts, the process is still inevitably
and realistically complicated and lengthy. Claimants still need law-
yers. There is a lot of information to provide and many forms to fill
out. Filing a claim requires complex documentation and takes time
and effort.
But more significantly, filling out the forms and filing with the Fund
requires that the claimant face the loss and translate human life into
monetary formulae. First, there is the issue of determining who is the
appropriate claimant. This may be complex, a source of family con-
flict, emotionally-laden, and time-consuming, and it adds an additional
121. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF
2001, GENERAL PROGRAM INFORMATION, available at www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/gen
eral info.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
122. There are, of course, special hurdles for families who do not speak English. Most of
these people come from low-income households, and they do not have access to computers. For
example, with respect to Spanish-speaking families, Feinberg has put information on the website
in Spanish and has done outreach to families with a Spanish interpreter. Nonetheless, these
individuals have an "uphill battle to even file with the VCF." E-mail from Saralyn Cohen, Pro
Bono Attorney, Shearman and Sterling, counsel for several Fund claimants, to author (Nov. 24,
2003) (on file with author).
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level of process. Then, once the appropriate claimant is determined,
the claimant must face the difficult fact that the life of his or her loved
one will be "worth" a number at the end of the process. Like any
legal process, the claims filing process can be experienced, by those
who must undergo it, as both dehumanizing and traumatic in its own
right. Not surprisingly, many people have said that the process of fil-
ing a claim with the Fund is "retraumatizing." While Feinberg is
proud of the way in which the claims process here has been simplified,
the Fund highlights some inherent tensions of this process.
The greatest advantage in a claims process is that a flat sum can be
quickly obtained with an arguably minimum amount of hassle and
work. That is the trade-off of the Fund. But despite best intentions,
the Fund is arguably the worst of both worlds, rather than the best.
With the Fund, there is neither a quick and flat sum, nor a purely
"administrative" process. 123 The process is actually very complex and
intimidating. Claimants need lawyers to assist them to figure out what
to do, and they may also need economists. 124 For some who have
made the decision to file with the Fund, the process itself has been
overwhelming. Larry Stewart, former president of Trial Lawyers
Care, told of one woman who had sought assistance over a dozen
times, saying each time she was finally ready to file a claim. But she
never sent in the paperwork, "because everything remind[ed] her of
her loss." ' 125 Jean Cleere of Newton, Iowa said, "They ask for a victim
impact statement ... I try to write something and I just can't."'1 26 For
many, this is the most difficult part, and the words will not come
out. 127 There is a threshold choice about whether to go to the Fund, a
decision which is very complex and difficult to figure out-indeed, by
Feinberg's own admission, almost paralyzing to many people. Then
there is the issue of determining the appropriate claimant, which may
involve a separate legal process. And then once a claimant has filed
with the Fund, there are many decisions-Track A versus Track B,
economic documentation, possible hearings, and possible appeal.
Each requires the claimant to deal concretely with the human and ma-
terial reality of the victim's life and the dimensions of the loss.
123. Weinstein, supra note 97.
124. See E-mail from Saralyn Cohen to author, supra note 122.
125. Lena Sun, 9/11 Families Slow To Seek Compensation; Some Weigh Lawsuits; Others Can't
Face Task, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2003, at A6.
126. Leslie Reed, 9/11 Victims Fund Deadline Near, Manager Tells Kin, OMAHA WORLD HER-
ALD, Oct. 18, 2003 (Sunrise Edition), at 10A, available at LEXIS News Library. OMWHLD File.
127. Id. Donn Marshall wondered, "How do you get started, and how do you do justice to
[the person who died]?" Sun, supra note 125.
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Another problematic dimension of the compensation process is that
it is totally individual. The claimant files on behalf of him or herself.
There is no way to be part of any group or collective process of heal-
ing. Grief and trauma have been, of course, most profound for those
who lost family members and loved ones and for the few individuals
who were seriously injured or were in the buildings, but the Fund in-
evitably focuses solely on the individual claimant. At least there has
not been a limited pie-so people are not directly competing with
each other-but there is still a sense of profound isolation in the
process.
C. Grief and Statutes of Limitations
A particularly problematic aspect of the Fund's procedures relates
to the statute of limitations. The two-year limitation for filing claims
with the Fund, by December 22, 2003, is set out in the Act. Although
Feinberg was concerned that this deadline was too early, and he
openly expressed these concerns, he had no discretion to modify it.128
At the very top of the first page of the Fund website was a running
time clock that prominently stated "57 days until Monday, December
22, 2003-the last day to file a claim. ' 129 This number changed daily
as the clock ticked closer to the deadline. The website now reads:
"The last day to file a claim was Monday, December 22, 2003."130
Feinberg's concern, that people would choose neither to sue nor file
a claim with the Fund by December 22, 2003 because they were still
emotionally traumatized, grieving, and paralyzed by grief, appeared to
be borne out by statements from survivors. 31
William Doyle, whose son Joey died in the trade center and who
maintains one of the largest e-mail networks of injury victims and
survivors ... said he was confident that most families know about
the Fund and are aware of the approaching deadline. "But you have
families out there that are still grieving," he said. "It's tough to
wade through all this paperwork. '132
A widow who is part of Mr. Doyle's e-mail list told him in January
2003 that she did "not know one family that has settled" with the
Fund. She still has not filed a claim with the Fund. "I have not given
it much thought ... I have been involved in other things just trying to
get through each day... [c]onsidering where most people are in their
128. Feinberg, supra note 94.
129. U.S. Dep't of Justice, SEPTEMBER 11TH VIc-rIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001, available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation (last visited Nov. 11, 2003) (updated periodically).
130. Id. (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
131. See Henriques, supra note 3.
132. Id.
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grief, from the people I know, the deadline Congress set is just too
soon."' 133 Responses like this "haunt[ed]" Feinberg as he headed off
to a new round of informational meetings across the country in Sep-
tember 2003. Even though he thought litigation was a mistake, he
hoped people would do something-either choose to sue or file with
the Fund.1 34 He said, "I really worry about the people who will arrive
at Dec. 22 having done nothing. Those people are united in their grief
and fear, and they're the people I'm trying to reach."' 135
At the end of October, with the December 22, 2003 deadline close
on his heels, Feinberg, apparently anxious that fewer than half those
eligible to file had done so, explained to the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York how victims could secure the option of pursuing
a lawsuit or seeking compensation from the Fund.136 He stated that
just beginning the application procedure would be sufficient to meet
the December deadline. 37 All that would be required to "save a
space" was the filing of Part One of the Victim Compensation Fund
application by December 22, which consists of "bare minimums":
name, address, and phone number of the person filing and the name
of the victim. 138 The next step in the process, providing economic and
verification documents, would not be due until January 22, 2004.139
With these numbers, Feinberg's staff will give families estimates of
their awards. Not until families have an idea of their estimated award
will they actually have to complete the application, and not until that
point do they waive their right to sue.140 Taking into account New
York's statute of limitations extension and the ability to suspend Sep-
tember 11th-related lawsuits, this simplification of procedure is in-
tended to permit potential filers to weigh their options for much
longer.141
The deadline was too short. The grief was still overwhelming, many
families had not faced the reality of their loss, and they found the
choices presented between the Fund and suing overwhelming. There
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Daniel Wise, Feinberg Clarifies 9/11 Fund Filing Procedures, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 3, 2003, at 1.
137. Id.
138. Id. Feinberg's staff will be disbanded on June 15, 2004, so all awards must be issued by
then. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Feinberg says that the Fund office has also contacted claimants individually to encourage
them to file. Some have said, "We will file," and some have said, "Please go away, we can't deal
with this." Feinberg, Presentation at Brooklyn/Cardozo Faculty Workshop on Ethical, Economic
and Social Issues in Mass Torts (Nov. 4, 2003), supra note 50.
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was recognition of this problem with respect to the option of suing
because, in July 2003, the statute of limitations for filing wrongful
death claims in New York State was extended for six months past Sep-
tember 11, 2003, when it would otherwise have run, in order to give
possible litigants more time to choose to sue. 142 Because of the differ-
ence in the limitation periods between the Fund and suing, claimants
had to make the decision to file with the Fund by December 2003, and
then may have a few more months in which to decide whether to sue,
assuming they do not sue any of the defendants that are barred by
their filing with the Fund. With the December 22, 2003 deadline for
filing with the Fund, this extension will give people more time to
weigh their legal rights. But survivors' groups say this is also very
confusing: "Families are confused," says William Doyle, "Between
the court and the Fund, there are a lot of different deadlines. ' 143
There was a push in Congress to extend the deadline for filing with
the Fund by one year. On September 9, 2003, Senator Patrick J.
Leahy introduced a bill entitled the September 11th Victim Compen-
sation Fund Extension Act of 2003 to change the deadline from De-
142. See Ramirez, supra note 110.
143. Henriques, supra note 3. The federal statute mandates that the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York has "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
actions brought for any claim (including any claim for loss of property, personal injury, or death)
resulting from or relating to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001." Sep-
tember 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 § 408(b)(3), 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2002). It pro-
vides that the substantive law of the state in which the crash occurred will apply. Id. § 408(b)(2).
Therefore, there still appears to be uncertainty whether people living outside of New York State
are governed by their own state statutes of limitations, such as Massachusetts, which is three
years. Dave Wedge, 9/11 Lawsuit Deadline Looms, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 5, 2003, at 001.
Some lawyers say that if the victim died in New York, then the New York extension applies. But
others are not so sure. Many lawyers advised their clients to err on the side of safety, and to file
by September 11, 2003. Kreindler & Kreindler, a law firm in New York, representing about 450
victims, filed 60 lawsuits on September 10, 2003. Furthermore, a New Jersey bill to extend their
two-year statute by one year is expected to be introduced in November 2003, and passage is
expected. Mary P. Gallagher et al., Inadmissible: Healing Time, N.J. L.J., Sept. 15, 2003, at 3.
In response to requests from family members of those killed on September 11, who wanted to
preserve their rights to file civil actions while their claims are pending with the Fund, Judge
Hellerstein ruled that plaintiffs may file a complaint and place it on suspense. In Re September
11 Litigation, No. 21-MC-97, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14411, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2003)
(order providing for placement of cases on Suspense Docket). If they then decide to go with the
Fund, their claims will be dismissed; if they decide to pursue the lawsuit, they will waive their
right to the benefits of the Fund. Id. at *3-4. This was the road taken by many in the days before
the two-year anniversary, when the statute of limitations would expire in most states, "simply to
protect the option." Ben Weiser, Two Years Later: Lawsuits; Families of Victims File To Meet a
Legal Deadline, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2003, at A21 (quoting Mark S. Moller, partner with Krein-
dler & Kreindler). As one woman whose husband died in the Pentagon attack explained, "Any-
thing I can get in the way of additional time for something like this is extremely helpful." Id.
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cember 22, 2003 to December 31, 2004,144 and identical measures were
introduced in the House by Representatives John Conyers and Vito
Fossella. t 45  Members of New York's Congressional Delegation ex-
pressed concern that the Fund's goals would not be met if Congress
did not extend the deadline; 46 however, by the end of November
2003, congressional officials from the New York area conceded that
the effort to extend the deadline had failed. 147
There appeared to be widespread support for an extension among
many victims and their families. In an on-line survey conducted by
the National Center for Victims of Crime, nearly eighty-seven percent
of 356 respondents who were eligible to apply to the Fund said they
supported extending the deadline for one year. 48 Susan Herman, Ex-
ecutive Director of the National Center, stated:
The looming December 22 deadline is simply more than many vic-
tims can manage .... More time won't heal all their wounds, but
our survey clearly shows that another year will allow many victims
to make more informed, thoughtful decisions and deal with the bur-
densome application process, if they decide to file a claim with the
Fund.' 49
At a forum at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln in late October,
however, Kenneth Feinberg seemed doubtful that Congress would ex-
tend the deadline, and continued to urge people to file by the current
144. Sun, supra note 125. A Bill To Amend the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund
of 2001 To Extend the Deadline for Filing a Claim to December 31, 2004. S. 1602, 108th Cong.
(2003), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/dlO8query.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2003) (latest
major action: referred to Senate committee Sept. 9, 2003).
145. To amend the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 To Extend Deadline
for Filing a Claim to December 31, 2004, H.R. 3084, 108th Cong. (2003) (latest major action:
referred to House subcommittee Oct. 22, 2003), available at http://thomas.loc.gov./bdd/dI08
query.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2003); To amend the September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund of 2001 To Extend the Deadline for Filing a Claim to December 31, 2004, H.R. 3116, 108th
Cong. (2003), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/.bss/dlO8query.htm (last major action: referred
to House Subcommittee Oct. 22, 2003) (last visited Oct. 30, 2003)).
146. Chen, supra note 4.
147. David W. Chen, Senate Rejects Bid for Extra Year of Filing for 9/11 Awards, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 26, 2003 at B1. Chen notes, "Feinberg has not expressed support for an extension. He did
not immediately return a call last night seeking comment on the latest congressional develop-
ment." Id.
148. Press Release, National Center for Victims of Crime, New Survey Shows Widespread
Support for 9/11 Fund Deadline Extension: September 11th Victims Seeking More Time To Deal
with Critical Choice (Oct. 17, 2003); available at http://www.ncvc.org/press/releases/11172003.
html (last visited Dec. 22, 2003). "The top three reasons survey respondents cited for supporting
an extension were needing more time 1) to heal emotionally; 2) to collect the back-up docu-
ments required by the Fund; and 3) to manage more pressing concerns such as employment,
housing, and other family matters. Victims also cited the need for more time to understand the
Fund's application process and to find effective legal assistance." Id.
149. Id. (quoting Susan Herman, Executive Director of the National Center for Victims of
Crime) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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deadline: "What happens on December 23rd or 24th, when a family
comes to me and says, 'We were in grief, but now we're ready to
file?'. . . There's nothing I can do. Maybe Congress will extend the
program-but don't bet on it.' 150 Feinberg was right.
There are many situations in which individuals who might sue in
tort experience serious trauma, and the law has recognized these is-
sues with respect to statutes of limitations provisions in a variety of
ways. Whether it is in the operation of the "discovery rule" or other
tolling formulations, exceptions have been developed in laws relating
to domestic violence, 151 sexual abuse, 152 and, most recently, clergy
sexual abuse 153 to toll the relevant statute of limitations provision for
the person who was harmed. Frequently, this is based on a recogni-
tion that trauma may involve memory loss or repression of memories.
For example, regarding domestic violence, a New York. court has rec-
ognized that a battered woman might be too traumatized to be able to
"assert her legal rights" under a New York tolling provision. 154 These
tolling modifications of the statute of limitations are suggestive and
reflect an effort to accommodate a victim's trauma in some circum-
stances. Unfortunately, the Fund was constrained by Congress to do
SO.
D. Repair
Surely there is no easy repair, restoration, or healing for the families
and friends who lost someone on September 11th and for all those
who suffered trauma. But, in assessing the Fund, it is important to ask
what might help play a role in restoration. I consider the psychologi-
cal impact of compensation, the need for governmental investigation,
and the impact of survivor groups and other collective processes.
150. Reed, supra note 126.
151. See generally DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 10, at 845-67; Jennifer Wriggins, Domes-
tic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121 (2001); Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic
Torts and Divorce: Constraints and Possibilities, 31 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 321 (1997).
152. See generally Lisa A. Atkins, Remembered Memories . . .True or False?-Should the
Discovery Rule Be Applied to Toll the Statute of Limitations?, 24. CAP. U. L. REV. 581 (1995);
Margaret Cornish, Tort Law-Applying the Discovery Rule To Toll the Statute of Limitations in
Incest Cases-Olson v. Hooley, 865 P.2d. 1345 (Utah 1993), 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 323 (1994).
153. Francis S. Ainsa, Permissive Statute of Limitation Policies, 36 CATH. LAW. 83 (1995); John
Caher, Victims of Clergy Sexual Abuse Seek Bill To Suspend Three-Year Statute of Limitations,
N.Y. L.J., May 21, 2003, at 1.
154. Nussbaum v. Steinberg, 703 N.Y.S.2d 32,33 (App. Div. 2000). See also Brief of Amici
Curiae, New York State Coalition Against Domestic Violence. et al. supra note 10 (on file with
author).
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The "psychology of compensation, '"1 55 how people react to receiv-
ing compensation for injury, is a subject on which little has been writ-
ten. Daniel Shuman has considered this issue in the context of tort
damage awards where there is a finding that the person or company
that the plaintiff sued is liable for the harm that the plaintiff suf-
fered.156 Many people certainly believe that a lawsuit can be thera-
peutic or have beneficial impact, and that may well be shaping some
of the choices that possible claimants have made to sue rather than
file with the Fund, although deciding who to sue and who to blame is
very complex.1 57 But we do not know about the psychological impact
of receiving money from a claims resolution process, no less the
Fund. Certainly one impact is material, there will be money for claim-
ants and their families to get help, therapy, and other support services.
But ambivalent feelings about money as a default for the loss shape
this issue.
The absence of full-scale governmental investigations of September
11th certainly has not helped the process of repair for families. Fami-
lies considering whether to file with the Fund have had no opportunity
to understand what happened on September 11th. For some, suing
has taken on this role. If government investigations had been vigor-
ously pursued and completed during these last two years, claimants
might have viewed the Fund differently. The government's "two
promises" might have been met.
A joint panel of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees fi-
nally released a report in late July 2003 that "provided a scathing cri-
tique of the performance of the F.B.I. and C.I.A. before the 2001
terrorist attacks. ' 158 It found that the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the Central Intelligence Agency had failed to respond to repeated
warnings that Al Qaeda intended to attack the United States. The
report referred to one newly disclosed intelligence document that
read: "Plans to hijack U.S. aircraft proceeding well. Two individuals
had successfully evaded checkpoints in dry run at [New York] air-
port. ' 159 It had a classified section, that according to those who had
155. Shuman, supra note 58, at 39.
156. Id. at 51.
157. Anthony J. Sebok, What's Law Got To Do With It? Designing Compensation Schemes in
the Shadow of the Tort System, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 501 (2003).
158. David Johnston, Report of 9/l Panel Cites Lapses by C.I.A. and F.B.L, N.Y. TIMES, July
25, 2003, at Al.
159. Id.
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read it, focused on support for terrorism within Saudi Arabia. 160 A
New York Times editorial concluded:
The Sept. 11 terrorist attacks might have been disrupted if
America's foreign and domestic intelligence agencies had done a
better job sharing information they already possessed about the ac-
tivities of Al Qaeda members. That is the most chilling finding of
an unflinching Congressional inquiry into the performance of the
country's spy agencies in the years leading up to the attacks." 161
Over the opposition of the White House, on November 27, 2002,
more than a year after the attacks, Congress created a national bipar-
tisan commission to investigate the September 11th terror attacks, in
response to intense pressure from the families of victims. President
Bush appointed former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to be
chair of the panel, but he quickly resigned after "family members of
victims of the attacks protested" his appointment and "because of his
ties to corporations and foreign governments that would come under
scrutiny in the inquiry."'1 62 The commission, the National Commis-
sion on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, is now chaired by
Thomas H. Kean, the former Republican governor of New Jersey; the
vice-chair is Lee H. Hamilton, a former Democratic member of the
House of Representatives from Indiana. Although this ten-member
Commission, split evenly between Republican and Democratic ap-
pointees, has an eighteen-month deadline to issue a report by May
2004, it only met for the first time in January 2003.163
In April 2003, relatives of those who died in the attack and some
survivors were finally able to testify at an all-day hearing held by the
Commission at the United States Custom House in Lower Manhattan,
not far from where the World Trade Center had been. But they were
justifiably frustrated and angry. It was a nineteen-month wait "that
they said was too long and too painful."' 164 "'I am convinced that this
tragedy did not have to happen,' said Stephen Push, a spokesman for
Families of Sept. 11, which pressed for the establishment of the com-
160. Id. at A13. See also David Johnston & Douglas Jehl, Bush Refuses To Declassify Saudi
Section of Report, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2003, at Al.
161. Editorial, Before and After Sept. 11, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2003, at A22. See also David
Johnston, The Warnings Were There. But Who Was Listening?, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2003, § 4
(Week in Review), at 7.
162. Philip Shenon, 9/11 Committee Members Establish Rules on Financial Disclosures and
Recusals, N.Y. TIMES, Jan: 28, 2003, at A13. However, potential conflicts of interest within the
Commission have continued. to surface. Eric Lichtblau & James Riser, 2 on 9/11 Panel Are Ques-
tioned on Earlier Security Roles, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2004, at A24.
163. Id.
164. David W. Chen, Beyond Numbers, 9/11 Panel Hears Families'Anguish, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
1, 2003, at Al.
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mittee. 'Too many politicians put re-election over national secur-
ity.""' 165 At the hearing, Mindy Kleinberg, whose husband Alan, a
securities trader at Cantor Fitzgerald, died on September 11th, pulled
out some of her own research on questionable immigration documents
submitted by one of the hijackers. "'With no one being held account-
able, how do we know this is still not happening?' she said. 'As the
threat of terrorism mounts here in the U.S., the need to address the
failures of Sept. 11 is more important than ever."",66
The Commission's investigation has been moving very slowly, ap-
parently with considerable resistance from the White House and nec-
essary governmental agencies. Commission chairs have complained
that the Commission's "work was being hampered by the failure of
executive branch agencies, especially the Pentagon and the Justice
Department, to respond quickly to requests for documents and testi-
mony" and released a statement saying that they had received only a
small part of the millions of sensitive documents they have requested
from the executive branch. 167 They noted that "the problems that
have arisen so far with the Department of Defense are becoming par-
ticularly serious" and "suggested that the Justice Department was be-
hind a directive barring intelligence officials from being interviewed
by the panel without the presence of agency colleagues. '' 168 Kean has
stated that he believed the Commission would be forced to issue sub-
poenas to executive branch agencies because of continuing delays
over access to documents, including Oval Office intelligence reports
that reached President Bush's desk in the weeks before the September
11th attacks.169 President Bush initially declined to commit the White
House to turning over reports to the Commission. 170
After substantial delay and under the threat of a subpoena, 171 the
White House offered the Commission a compromise to view the intel-
ligence summary documents, known as the President's Daily Briefs,
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Philip Shenon, 9/11 Commission Says U.S. Agencies Slow Its Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
2003, at Al.
168. Id.
169. Philip Shenon, 9/11 Commission Could Subpoena Oval Office Files, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26,
2003, at Al.
170. Philip Shenon, Bush Weighing Decision on Release of Classified Documents to Sept. 11
Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2003, at A18.
171. Philip Shenon, 9/11 Panel May Reject Offer of Limited Access to Briefings, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 2003, at A22; Philip Shenon, 9/11 Panel Issues Subpoena to Pentagon, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
8, 2003, at A13.
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that had, until mid-November 2003, been withheld. 172 While the pre-
cise terms of the agreement are not public by White House request,
the Commission may choose two of its ten members to view the docu-
ments in their entirety; two more to view specific paragraphs ex-
cerpted by the White House; and all four members may take notes,
subject to White House review and editing if something is determined
possibly to compromise national security.173 The White House will
remove everything unrelated to Al Qaeda because the Commission is
uninterested in anything else.1 74 The White House is concerned that
information in the documents "might be construed to suggest that the
White House failed to respond to evidence suggesting that Al Qaeda
was planning a catastrophic attack."'175
The Commission has accepted the offer, saying that they "believe[d]
it will prove satisfactory and enable [them] to get [their] job done."1 76
Some members seem to be taking the attitude that something is better
than nothing, that the access will be adequate and at least there is
"immediate access to important material that [they had] been long
delayed in receiving."'177 But this acceptance was met with considera-
ble opposition from some Commission members, saying that the
White House should not have the power to determine what is relevant
to the investigation. 178 Former Representative Timothy J. Roemer of
Indiana said, "In paraphrasing Churchill, never have so few commis-
sioners reviewed such important documents with so many restrictions
.... I am not happy with this agreement, and I will not support it.' 7 9
Not surprisingly, families are pleased neither with the compromise,
fearing that it will "prevent a full uncovering of the truth,"'180 nor with
the fact that the terms are kept secret, arguing that "this entire deal
needs to be explained to the public .... This is an independent com-
172. Philip Shenon, Deal on 9/11 Briefings Lets White House Edit Papers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
14, 2003, at A24. The President's Daily Briefs are 10-12 pages long and are compiled daily by the
CIA highlighting what the CIA considers to be the most important intelligence information
gathered that day. Philip Shenon, Panel Reaches Deal on Access to 9/11 Papers, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 2003, at Al. A former security advisor described the papers a "news digest for the very
privileged." Richard V. Allen, An Intelligent Thing to Do, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2003, at A29.
173. Shenon, Deal on 9/11 Briefing Lets White House Edit Papers, supra note 172.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Shenon, Panel Reaches Deal on Access to 9/11 Papers, supra note 172.
177. Id. (quoting commission member Richard Ben-Veniste).
178. Shenon, Deal on 9/11 Briefing Lets White House Edit Papers, supra note 172.
179. Shenon, Panel Reaches Deal on Access to 9/11 Papers, supra note 172.
180. Shenon, Deal on 9/11 Briefings Lets White House Edit Papers, supra note 172 (quoting
the Family Steering Committee).
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mission that is supposed to be transparent, that is supposed to be
open." 81
A New York Times editorial entitled "Facing the Truth of Sept.
11th," described the Commission as being "in danger of becoming a
study in recalcitrance by the Bush Administration," and argued:
How can an unstinting investigation of the truth of Sept. 11 not be
of paramount concern to any official sworn to protect the public?
The approaching presidential election makes the administration's
evasions even more suspect. Failure to document and face the truth
will only feed conspiracy theories and undermine the nation's
chances of weathering future threats. 182
These are very serious problems that raise questions about the likely
completeness and accuracy of the Commission's ultimate report. Per-
haps even more serious is our failure as a country "to examine Ameri-
can foreign policy dispassionately, to inquire whether it legitimately
provokes a level of anger that is likely to engender terrorism and
other violent responses. 18 3 But absence of a vigorous inquiry con-
ducted by the highest levels of government during the years since Sep-
tember 11th has made it even more difficult for many families to file
with the Fund, because filing makes them feel that they are giving up
on any investigation. In a letter to the New York Times, Sally
Regenhard, founder of one of the survivor groups, the Skyscraper
Safety Campaign, argues that the "best 'group therapy at ground zero'
for the families of the victims would be to ... find out how 9/11 hap-
pened to our country; why the World Trade Center collapsed; and to
hold persons and institutions responsible and accountable for this
atrocity. That is the only therapy we need."'81 4 This has had a serious
impact on potential claimants' view of the Fund.
The lack of democratic process in the establishment of the Fund or
in the appointment of the Special Master exacerbates this problem of
trust. This relates to Tyler's concerns with "voice. 1 s5 September 11th
families were given little opportunity to shape the process and the se-
lection of the administrator, although there were many comments on
181. Id. (quoting Kristen Breitweiser, spokesperson for the Family Steering Committee) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
182. Editorial, Facing the Truth of Sept. 11, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 2003, at A26.
183. Lawrence M. Solan, Cognitive Foundations of the Impulse To Blame, 68 BROOK. L. REV.
1003, 1024 (2003). See also W. Michael Reisman, Aftershocks: Reflections on the Implications of
September 11, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 81 (2003).
184. Sally Regenhart, Letter to the Editor, The Best 9/11 Therapy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003,
at A14.
185. Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 116.
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the Interim Final Rule that were posted to the website. 186 There has
been far more democratic process concerning the new September 11th
memorial at the former World Trade Center site than with the Fund.
It is arguable that a fuller process would have meant that there would
never have been a Fund because Congress had to act under immediate
pressure to give the families something after bailing out the airlines.
But as a result, some claimants experience the Fund as the govern-
ment trying to "buy them out" or "shut them up. '"187
The fact that people experienced the September 11th disaster as a
form of moral harm highlights a related dimension of problems with
the Fund."8 When people have been victims of moral harm, they do
not seek material compensation, but instead look for an apology and
for ways to restore moral balance. 189 Instead, the Act treats the ter-
rorist attacks as an "accident" and focuses on providing compensation
for harm. Victims are likely to view September 11th as a moral harm
and "a symbolic assault on America and [will likely] want some way to
bring someone to account for the occurrence of the event."'190 For this
reason, as the sole governmental response, the Fund is inherently
limited.
Contrast, for example, the possibility of apology-apology by the
United States government for intelligence failures that appear to have
led to September 11th. 191 One could argue that the reason that the
Fund was passed so quickly by Congress is because the Fund is a form
of implicit apology to survivors for the United States government's
role; if so, it is an apology without acknowledgment of the problem.
Scholars have argued that meaningful apology would have to include
the following five elements: "1) the hurtful act happened, caused in-
jury, and was wrongful; 2) the apologizer was at fault and regrets par-
ticipating in the act; 3) the apologizer will compensate the injured
party; 4) the act will not happen again; and 5) the apologizer intends
186. Deborah R. Hensler, Money Talks: Searching for Justice Through Compensation for Per-
sonal Injury and Death, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 417 (2003).
187. Thanassis Cambanis, Seeking Answers at Any Cost: 9/11 Widow Passes Up $1.85M Pay-
ment, Presses Wrongful-Death Suit, BOSTON GLOBE, May 14, 2002, at Al. See generally Lisa
Belkin, Just Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002, § 6 (magazine), at 92.
188. Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 116.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 6.
191. Daniel Shuman discusses the role of apology in tort law. Shuman, supra note 58. Sharon
Lamb discusses the way that "[a]pologies reconnect the wrongdoer to some party he or she has
wronged, if only briefly, whether it is an individual or society." Sharon Lamb, The Psychology of
Condemnation: Underlying Emotions and Their Symbolic Expression in Condemning and Sham-
ing, 68 BROOK L. REV. 929, 954 (2003).
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to work for good relations in the future."' 92 None of these have hap-
pened. The Bush administration has not only claimed that the govern-
ment was not at fault, but has barred the National Commission
investigating September 11th from full access to government
documents.
Perhaps the Fund could be viewed as a form of reparation, although
the term is never used. Reparation is the "act or process of mending
or restoring" and "of making amends, offering expiation, or giving sat-
isfaction for a wrong or injury."' 93 Traditionally, the word has been
associated with a nation defeated in war, 94 and more recently with
African Americans and slavery. a95 The Fund is meant "to compensate
those injured or killed in the September 11 terrorist attacks.' 96 Com-
pensation means "something that makes up for a loss" and the "act or
action of making up, making good, or counterbalancing." 197 While
not taking blame for the tragedies of the September 11th attacks, and
recognizing that "[n]o amount of money can right the horrific wrongs
done,"' 98 the United States is arguably attempting to mend, to restore,
and to "giv[e] satisfaction for a wrong or injury."' 99 The Special
Master "believe[s] that America is unique in creating such a Fund that
expresses the compassion, concern and determination of its people in
coming to the aid of the victims of September 11."200
In addition to the moral dimension-an aspect of the repair that
Judith Herman discusses-there is also the social and human dimen-
sion of repair that she and others have emphasized. A lawsuit, partic-
ularly a group or class-action lawsuit, may appear to offer litigants the
192. Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in
Japan and the United States, 20 LAW & Soc'v REV. 461, 469-70 (1986). For a discussion of apol-
ogy, reparations, and truth commissions, see MARTHA MINOW & NANCY L. ROSENBLUM,
BREAKING THE CYCLES OF HATRED; MEMORY, LAW AND REPAIR (2002).
193. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, UN-
ABRIDGED, supra note 53, at 1923.
194. Roger P. Alford, On War as Hell, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 207 (2002).
195. Eric K. Yamamoto et al., American Racial Justice on Trial-Again: African American
Reparations, Human Rights, and the War on Terror, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1269 (2003); Lee A.
Harris, "Reparations" as a Dirty Word: The Norm Against Slavery Reparations, 33 U. MEM. L.
REV. 409 (2003).
196. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,235(Dec. 21, 2001)
(codified at 28 C.F.R. §104 (2002)).
197. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW'INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, UN-
ABRIDGED, supra note 53, at 463.
198. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. at 11,233 (statement by
Special Master).*
199. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, UN-
ABRIDGED, supra note 53, at 1923 (language of the definition of reparation).
200. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. at 11,235 (statement by
the Special Master).
2003]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:457
possibility of some collective experience, even if, in reality, it may be
illusory. The individual nature of the Fund necessarily emphasizes
that each claimant is acting alone and that money-not building com-
munity or providing moral or social repair-is the goal. Many family
members have formed or joined organizations of survivors after Sep-
tember 11th, and many different organizations have proliferated. 20 1
Some family members have described how becoming involved with
these organizations and becoming politically active has been an im-
portant dimension of the process of healing. Sally Regenhard, of the
Skyscraper Safety Campaign, has said: "The greatest balm to your
grief and your wounds is getting justice .... When we get justice, it
will change the world, but it's probably going to take the rest of my
lifetime. ''2 02 Monica Iken, founding member of another group, Sep-
tember's Mission, said her organization is "how [she] get[s] up in the
morning. '20 3 Protests on a range of issues, such as the construction
site at ground zero, continue.20 4 These organizations have arguably
provided survivors with some of the sense of community and solidar-
ity that Herman and Erikson suggest as a means of healing and repair.
But this sense of community has not been facilitated by the Fund's
processes. If anything, opposition to the Fund may have provided an
incentive for organizing. 205
201. Many September 1lth survivors and victims' families have channeled their anguish into a
variety of collective actions. Some groups, such as the Families of September 11 (www.familiesof
septemberll.org) and September 11 Advocates, have focused on lobbying Congress for account-
ability, and advocated for reforms to ensure that attacks like these do not happen again. Others,
such as the Skyscraper Safety Campaign (www.skyscrapersafety.org), are demanding a federal
investigation into why the towers collapsed, and that all skyscrapers meet fire and building
codes. Still others, such as Give Your Voice (www.giveyourvoice.com) and 9/11 Widows' & Vic-
tims' Families Association (www.911wvfa.org), concentrate on proper recovery and burial of
victims. September's Mission (www.septembersmission.org) is one of the many groups that fo-
cus on the memorial to be built where the towers once stood. Still others, like the WTC United
Family Group (www.wtcufg.org) and the NYFD Widows (www.nyfdwidows.net), focus on
mental health and support through online chat rooms and links to other resources. September
11 th Families for Peaceful Tomorrows (www.peacefultomorrows.org) strives to combat terrorism
through peaceful alternatives. All organizations serve as support groups for those who have
suffered losses. Some of these organizations are faith-based. Kellyanne Conway, The
Microeconomic Effects of the Terrorist Attacks on September 11: Americans Helping Americans,
16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 101, 113-16 (2002).
202. Johnson, supra note 89.
203. Id.
204. Michael Slackman, 9/11 Relatives Plan Protest at Ground Zero Work Site, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 3, 2003, at B5.
205. On the other hand, even some of those who were most active and vocal in opposing the
Fund have now decided to file. On May 22, the New York Law Journal reported the following:
Kenneth Feinberg, the head of the federal September 1lth Victim Compensation Fund,
won an important convert during a session at the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York on Monday. Charles Wolf, who lost his wife at the World Trade Center, had
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The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is
an example of a collective process that has involved investigation, get-
ting at the "truth" of the abuses of the apartheid regime, and promot-
ing "reconciliation." Despite a range of views about the effectiveness
of the TRC within South Africa today, the TRC was an unprece-
dented experiment in a form of "national consciousness-raising. '2 06
Testimony was heard by over 20,000 people, and hearings were broad-
cast on radio and television. The vast number of victims of state-
sponsored violence who testified before the TRC sought restoration
of their own sense of dignity through public recognition of the injus-
tices they had suffered. 20 7 With the Fund, there has been no public
opportunity for families to tell their stories-and to have any recogni-
tion that society values what happens to them.208
These examples highlight alternative dimensions of healing. One
can argue that the Fund was not established to repair or to heal, but to
compensate (or as some argue, to buy off families who were being
prevented from suing the airlines), so that these examples are simply
irrelevant. But the exclusivity of the Fund as the only governmental
response, and the concomitant absence of governmental investigation
been one of Mr. Feinberg's most persistent and vocal critics. He runs a Web site called
"Fix the Fund," and has bashed the Fund in several national TV appearances. But at
the City Bar, Mr. Wolf announced that he is filing with Fund and is urging others to do
the same. He attributed his change of heart to the "compassion" Mr. Feinberg exhib-
ited at the City Bar session, and to the recognition that the process of seeking compen-
sation was an emotional "last hurrah" for his wife.
9/11 Fund Master Wins Over Persistent Critic, N.Y .L.J., May 22, 2003, at 1.
206. Judith Lewis Herman, Peace on Earth Begins at Home, in MINOw, & ROSENBLUM supra
note 192, at 196.
207. Id.
208. Many countries, such as Argentina, Yugoslavia, and South Africa, have used truth com-
missions to bring about an understanding between victims and perpetrators, so that a nation can
move on from past atrocities and begin anew with a common history. See Carrie J. Niebur
Eisnaugle, An International "Truth Commission": Utilizing Restorative Justice as an Alternative to
Retribution, 36 VAND J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209, 224 (2003). The TRC of South Africa established
the Gross Human Rights Violations Committee, giving victims a medium to voice their stories to
the nation through local public hearings and forums, and the Committee on Reparation and
Rehabilitation, ensuring that these stories were heard and acknowledged by an official body. Id.
at 228. In exchange for amnesty, perpetrators were also asked to "tell everything," and victims
were permitted to ask them questions. Id. at 228-29. Although there were many complex reac-
tions to this experience, with some victims feeling that their individual stories were subsumed by
the collective process, it was a start.
Although the harms suffered by the victims of the September l1th attacks at the hands of the
U.S. government are different from those suffered by the victims of other regimes, in that the
U.S. government failed to protect, rather than allowing government-sanctioned human rights
violations, a truth commission on the U.S. government's failings regarding September l1th
would offer a forum for national recognition of the harms the victims have suffered and would
explore the governmental accountability for the tragedy. Government blocking of the the Na-
tional Commission's access to information makes this option unimaginable.
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and assertion of responsibility, highlight the moral and psychological
ambiguity of compensation as the sole vehicle for repair. If we take
the experience of grief and trauma around September 11th seriously,
these are issues that must be faced.
V. COMPARED TO WHAT?
Surely it is not fair to examine the problematic dimensions of the
Fund with respect to grief and trauma, without some discussion of the
alternative, tort litigation. Some of the issues that I have raised with
respect to the Fund are issues that would have been problems, per-
haps even greater problems, with the tort system. Certainly, there
would have been different problems. Can any legal process ever re-
ally take account of grief and trauma?
Although lawsuits have already been filed and some information on
the attacks has resulted from discovery, it is arguable that tort litiga-
tion is not a credible alternative in this context.209 Despite Judge Hel-
lerstein's decision permitting the cases against the airlines and other
defendants to go forward to discovery, others have argued that it is
not a real option.210 Feinberg certainly agrees with this view. He says:
"If people want to litigate, fine... I think it's a mistake, it's ineffective
and protracted and it prevents closure-but at least they're making a
choice.",211 But even if tort litigation provided a more genuine alter-
native to the Fund, there would still be questions as to whether the
tort system would handle issues of grief and trauma any better.
Certainly tort litigation can be devastating. The process of litigation
is very time-consuming and very labor-intensive. Discovery can be
brutal, and the emotional experience of counter-discovery, discovery
conducted by defendants against plaintiffs, is often particularly diffi-
cult and stressful. The extent of available counter-discovery fre-
quently surprises plaintiffs who tend to think of tort litigation as
purely affirmative-as a means of "getting the defendants" for the
harm that they have caused. Many plaintiffs are either not fully ad-
vised by their lawyers, or cannot really understand at the time that
they are making the decision to sue, how much investigation the de-
fendant will be able to do of them and their lives, and the degree to
which their actions and lives will be part of the lawsuit. The fact that
209. Analysis of the tort issues presented by the disaster is beyond the scope of this Article.
210. Sebok, supra notes 115 and 157.
211. See Henriques, supra note 3.
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litigation will take a long time can also be a serious problem for plain-
tiffs in dealing with grief and trauma.212
Although the tort cases that have been brought as a result of Sep-
tember 11th are largely class actions, and therefore arguably provide
more of a collective context, tort litigation, particularly litigation of
wrongful death cases, is generally as individual and isolating as the
Fund claims process. 213 And despite litigants' aspirations, this litiga-
tion may neither disclose much information, nor be transformative
with respect to governmental investigation of the disaster, because the
government is likely to withhold documents and block access, as it is
doing with the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States. Of course, the way the litigation process would be ex-
perienced by individuals who were suing would very much depend on
their experience with their lawyer, the judge, how the judge handles
the case, and how the lawyer for the defendant handles the process.
One difference is that suing necessarily involves lawyers, while in the-
ory, the Fund does not.
The Fund was not intended to require claimants to have lawyers,
because the procedures were supposed to be simple and accessible by
lay people. But it has not turned out that way because of the com-
plexity of the process, and the emotionally difficult aspects of making
choices about what to do and of gathering materials in support of a
claim. Many claimants have understandably felt the need for legal
representation. Pro bono organizations such as Trial Lawyers Care
and other organizations have been very much involved. 214 In general,
212. Daniel W. Shuman, When Time Does Not Heal: Understanding the Importance of Avoid-
ing Unnecessary Delay in the Resolution of Tort Cases, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 880 (2000)
(examining the harm that delay in the resolution of tort cases causes to both plaintiffs and de-
fendants and concluding that a right to speedy trial is important in civil cases).
213. Judge Hellerstein dismissed the class action allegations in Mulligan v. Port Auth.. 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18667.
214. Charles Schleifer, a volunteer attorney for Trial Lawyers Care (TLC), notes, "[T]he fig-
ure is not magical .... There are a lot of things to be done to maximize the amount these people
can get from these funds .... It really takes skill in taking the life history of these people and
extrapolating the best, way to show what their economic loss is," as well as their noneconomic
loss. Laurie Stewart, Local Attorney Provides TLC to Sept. 11 Victims, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
Nov. 22, 2002, at 7.
In the wake of the September 11th attacks, many lawyers offered services to the victims of
September l1th, in what one scholar described as the "second wave of rescue efforts." Tanina
Rostain, Professional Commitments in a Changed World, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811, 1814
(2002). Various bar associations and firms set up hotlines, formed walk-in clinics for small busi-
ness owners, adapted their websites to include September 11th legal and financial information,
and coordinated pro bono efforts. Id. TLC (www.911help.org), formed by the Association of
Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA) together with New York Trial Lawyers' Association
(NYTLA), is one of the largest pro bono organizations representing victims and victims' families
in cases seeking compensation from the Fund. Id. at 1818. The former president of TLC, Larry
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a claimant probably fares better with legal representation. 215 But law-
yers' fees can make this problematic. On the one hand, the govern-
ment created the Victim Compensation Fund to compensate victims;
some argue that this money should not be undermined or diminished
by hefty lawyers' fees.216 On the other hand, victims have a right to
choose who they want to represent them, "to choose lawyers they be-
lieve will get them the most money from the [F]und. ''21 7
As a result, there has been much controversy regarding legal fees.
In the tort system, it is common for lawyers to represent plaintiffs on a
contingency basis and then take a third or more of the recovery. 218
With the Fund, some lawyers have taken less,219 but the fact that some
have charged their clients at all has been the subject of some debate.
The role of the lawyer in the Fund process is more abbreviated than it
would be in most tort litigation, and there is no opposing counsel, only
Special Master Feinberg who is the final decision maker. However, it
is arguable that, given the appearance of the problem of "insider ac-
cess" to the Special Master, access to a lawyer, and who that lawyer is,
matters more with the Fund than it would with litigation. Although
Feinberg sought to humanize the process in ways that a judge sitting
Stewart, estimated that their services are saving victims $60 million in legal fees. Larry S. Stew-
art, Letter to the Editor, Articles Fail to Recognize Trial Lawyers' Work, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 28, 2002,
at 2. (Larry Stewart is the former president of Trial Lawyers Care.). See also Rostain, supra at
1818.
215. Stewart, supra note 214.
216. Frank James, Lawyers Fee Debate Holds Up New Terror Victims Fund, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
3, 2002, § 1, at 11.
217. Id.
218. What has spurred a debate is whether one should charge for legal counsel. Traditionally,
trial lawyers have charged a contingency fee, usually about 40% of the total award. Julie Kay,
Sad Dilemma, BROWARD DAILY Bus. REV., Sept. 11, 2002, at Al. By September 2002 it was
estimated that 500 families had retained counsel whom they had agreed to pay on a contingency
basis. Id. See also David W. Chen, Saying No to Free 9/11 Aid, Many Families Hire Lawyers,
N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2002, at B1. Part of their reason in doing this was the delay in being as-
signed counsel through TLC; another part was that not all lawyers signed up for pro bono work,
and there is still a belief of "getting what you pay for." Id. As one lawyer, whose firm is charg-
ing contingency fees up to 25%, put it: "The dream of every defendant is that the other side
doesn't have lawyers. The second best, O.K., go to some free lawyers." Id. Most of the lawyers
who are charging on a contingency fee basis are doing so at an extremely discounted rate of 10-
20%. Kay, supra. See also Chen, supra; James, supra note 216. One small Staten Island firm is
charging 5% for the first million, and 10% for anything over the first million. Chen, supra. A
firm in Chicago is charging 10% of the Fund award, and up to 25% of any litigation award. Id.
219. Feinberg estimates that approximately one-third of all claimants have been represented
by pro bono counsel, one-third by lawyers who have been charging an 8-10% contingency fee of
the total award, and one-third who are not represented by lawyers. Kenneth Feinberg, Presenta-
tion at Brooklyn/Cardozo Faculty Workshop on Ethical, Economic, and Social Issues in Mass
Torts (Nov. 4, 2003). See Chen, supra note 218. Some observers have suggested that the num-
bers of those represented by counsel are greater. Telephone interview with Susan Herman, Ex-
ecutive Director, National Center for Victims of Crime (Nov. 19, 2003).
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on a wrongful death case might not, the Fund's procedures and result-
ing paperwork are still very intimidating. The role of lawyers dealing
with the Fund and with litigation, and assisting families and survivors
of September 11th in coping with their grief and trauma, is one of the
many aspects of the Fund that needs to be documented and studied in
order to assess the Fund.
One other difference with the Fund is that litigation can result in a
judgment of liability determined by a judge or jury, a judgment that
may feel to a grieving or traumatized person, as equivalent to a deter-
mination of right and wrong.220 Of course, it is not a moral determi-
nation, but a legal determination of responsibility for the harm.
Frequently, there is no judgment entered by a court because much tort
litigation is resolved by settlement.221 How plaintiffs react to tort set-
tlements when there is no dispositive finding of liability, compared
with cases where there is a judicial determination of liability, is not
clear. 222 It is reasonable to think that many plaintiffs will still experi-
ence a settlement with monetary compensation as a victory and inter-
pret it as a finding that the defendant did something wrong or as an
admission of responsibility for the harm. In contrast, the monetary
"award" that the claimant gets from the Fund has no such meaning.
The defendants who directly caused the harm are not even in the pro-
cess, and to some degree, are still unknown. Although the govern-
ment may be implicitly acknowledging some liability by compensating
the families, this is not what the Act claims to be doing. The "award"
is simply money, and money that carries a morally and psychologically
ambiguous meaning.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR CIVIL LITIGATION AND
CLAIMS RESOLUTION PROCESSES
Although the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 is
unique in many respects, the concerns that I have raised here respect-
ing the Fund have implications for civil litigation and claims resolution
process generally.223 These concerns, the exclusive reliance on money
and compensation, the complexity of processes of the Fund, procedu-
220. For discussion of the pervasiveness of settlement in the federal courts, see Patrick E.
Higginbotham, So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts?, 55 SMU L. REV. 1495 (2002).
221. For a thoughtful discussion of how jurors might assess 9/11 cases, see Neal R. Feigenson,
Emotions, Risk Perceptions and Blaming in 9/11 Cases, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 959 (2003).
222. There is a need for empirical research on this issue, as well.
223. The implications of the Fund for the tort system generally, and for "tort reform" in par-
ticular, are beyond the scope of this Article.
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ral justice, the statute of limitations, and the need for alternative
means of repair are important to consider in assessing these processes.
With the Fund, there are a number of circumstances coming to-
gether relating to grief that are likely to have caused the surprisingly
low claimant rate until the month before the deadline. Claimants and
family members, many of whom are now single parents, largely single
mothers, have been faced with tremendous daily responsibilities just
to keep themselves and their families going, both materially and emo-
tionally. The work that one needs to do in order to get the process
started, either with the Fund or by filing a lawsuit, seems immense.
The choices are agonizing and, in many ways, overwhelming. Do I file
with the Fund or sue? Do I need a lawyer? If I decide to file with the
Fund, can I be designated as the claimant? If I can, do I file under
Track A or Track B? How do I pull together the documentation that I
need to file? If I sue, who do I sue? Who do I trust to talk to about
all these decisions? All of the outcomes here are unpredictable. Indi-
viduals who are overwhelmed with the daily responsibilities of life are
paralyzed by the choices that have to be made even to address these
issues. Each of these choices involves facing the reality of the loss, as
well as considerable emotion, documentation, and paperwork.
As the deadline approached, Feinberg attempted to respond to
these feelings, urging potential claimants to file the minimum piece of
paper in order to preserve their rights under the Fund and meet the
December 22, 2003 deadline. As I write, in January 2004, the Fund is
still accepting application material. 224 But there may be other factors
that account for the delayed filing. The earlier discussion of "closure"
and the ambiguities of grief highlight the fact that common assump-
224. The week before the deadline, in an e-mail message to Bill Doyle, who maintains a large
listserve for September 11 victims, Special Master Kenneth Feinberg wrote:
Bill,
You are doing the Lord's work in making sure that every family knows of the impend-
ing December 22 deadline. Please inform each of them that it will be compounding the
tragedy of 9/11 if grief stricken families fail to take advantage of the generosity of the
Fund. Scholarship funds can be created with the money, charitable foundations can be
established and memorials funded all in the name of the blessed victim. Also, all I need
by December 22 is the first few pages of the application form; I do not need any of the
economic information until later. I ALSO WILL WAIVE THE JANUARY 22 DEADLINE FOR
SUBMITTING THE REMAINDER OF THE MATERIALS IF THE FAMILY NEEDS MORE TIME TO
GATHER TOGETHER THE DOCUMENTATION. Over three-quarters of all eligible 9/11 fam-
ilies (76%!) have now filed with the Fund. But there is only one week left, so all re-
maining families must act now to preserve their rights. The December 22 deadline will
not be extended by Congress. You're the best!
Ken
National Center for Victims of Crime - 9-11: A Crime That Affects Us All - Getting Help, http:/
/www.ncvc.org/9-11/email.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
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tions about the Fund's processes, and what families can get from the
Fund as a form of "closure," may be oversimplified. In addition, the
fact that the Fund relied on one individual, the Special Master, for
decision making, that there was a lack of trust in the Fund because of
the unbounded discretion that Feinberg was provided by Congress,
and a sense that by filing, one is letting the government "off the hook"
compound these difficulties. Finally, in light of the history of the Act,
the reasons for, and speed with which it was passed, Congress did not
consider or anticipate the depth of grief and its impact on families,
and in particular, the way that this might affect the statute of
limitations.
Thinking more deeply about grief and its impact on civil litigation
and claims resolution processes is important. Understanding that
"closure" is complex and variable, is a start. Claims resolution or civil
litigation may play many different roles-healing for some, exacerbat-
ing grief for others. It is also important to acknowledge the paralyzing
impact of forum choice. The purpose of claims resolution processes is
to simplify-to give a sum of money, to avoid the hassle of litigation.
This purpose-simplification of the process-was undermined by the
September 11th Fund because of the issue of choice. When survivors
lose a family member in an airplane crash, they know that they have
to sue if they want compensation-they have no other choice. Here,
it is the choice of what to do-the Fund or sue--that has been so
agonizing for so many victims.
With the Fund, the effectiveness of claims resolution has been re-
duced because of other factors as well, such as the complexity of the
process, the documentation that is necessary, the discretion of the
Special Master and of his decisions, and the fact that his discretion is
unreviewable. Mistrust of government and the failure of the govern-
ment to take responsibility for failures to protect the public, and possi-
bly prevent the tragedy, have probably complicated survivors'
responses. While these factors are unique with the Fund, they raise
broader questions about the conception, structure, and procedural as-
pects of claims processing systems, and how failure to consider the
realities of grief and impact of loss can limit the effectiveness of these
processes.
VII. CONCLUSION
Experience with the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of
2001 reveals that grief and trauma are critical issues that should be
recognized in our assessment of civil litigation and claims resolution
processes. Failure to recognize the severity of survivors' grief and
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trauma and their moral and human needs limited the effectiveness of
the Fund in a number of ways. Affirmative recognition of the grief
and trauma that survivors experience can help us think differently
about claims resolution processes and litigation and make these
processes more meaningful.
